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RETHINKING TREASURY REGULATION § 1.162-5
AND SLAYING THE MONSTER IN THE
EDUCATION TAX MAZE
Vincent G. Kalafat*
INTRODUcTION
Among the many heroic tales told by the ancient Greeks is that of
Theseus and the Minotaur. The story begins in Athens with the un-
timely death of Androgeus, the son of Minos, King of Crete. To pun-
ish the Athenians for his son's death, Minos demanded a grisly tribute
of them. Each year, seven young men and seven maidens fair were to
be sent from Athens to Crete. Soon after their arrival, Minos would
place them in an elaborate and deadly maze known as the Labyrinth.
The Labyrinth had been constructed to confine the Minotaur, a fero-
cious monster, half man and half bull. As the nature of the Labyrinth
prevented escape, the Athenians were doomed to death either by star-
vation in the depths of the maze or at the hands of the Minotaur. In
time, Theseus, son of the King of Athens, was numbered among these
unlucky ones and, although he had already performed many valiant
deeds, there was little hope for his return when he set sail for Crete.
Upon his arrival in Crete, however, the daughter of Minos immedi-
ately fell in love with Theseus. The princess secretly gave Theseus a
magic ball of thread to guide him through the maze and told him how
to defeat the Minotaur. Armed thus, Theseus bravely entered the
maze, slew the monster, and escaped Crete with the princess.1
Throughout the years, Congress has created its own daunting tax
maze in the Internal Revenue Code (the Code) 2 relating to higher
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2006; B.A., Carroll
College, 2003. I would like to thank my family and friends for their support and
encouragement and Sarah Fuhrman for her creative suggestions and revisions. Also,
I would like to thank Professors MathewJ. Barrett, Robert Chapman, and Alan Gunn
for providing helpful insights, comments, and guidance on earlier drafts.
1 See ROBERT GAvEs, THE GREEK MYTHs 336-39 (Michel W. Pharand ed., 2001).
There are, of course, variations among the accounts of Theseus and the Minotaur.
2 All citations to the Code refer to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended, unless otherwise indicated.
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education. Without considering the direct financial aid through gov-
ernment grants and subsidized loans, the various tax incentives3 for
higher education fall into three broad categories: (1) tax benefits for
future expenses, (2) tax benefits for past expenses, and (3) tax bene-
fits for current expenses. 4 The first category, tax benefits for future
educational expenses, provides favorable tax treatment of qualified
distributions from Coverdell Education Savings Accounts5 and from
Qualified Tuition Programs (also known as "529 Plans"), 6 avoidance
of the ten percent penalty for certain early distributions from Individ-
ual Retirement Accounts (IRAs), 7 as well as an exclusion from gross
income for interest earned on certain qualified U.S. savings bonds.8
Tax benefits for past educational expenses include an above-the-line
deduction for interest paid on student loans9 and an exclusion from
gross income for the cancellation of certain student loans.' 0 The final
category, tax benefits for current educational expenses, encompasses
an exclusion from gross income for certain scholarships and fellow-
ships"1 and qualified employer-provided assistance under an educa-
3 The loss of tax revenues when the Code provides for a special exclusion, de-
duction, or credit, preferential tax rates, or a deferral of tax liability is commonly
referred to as a tax expenditure. Essentially, one can view the revenue losses from
special tax relief as the functional equivalent of a spending program-the govern-
ment simultaneously collects the revenue and makes a direct budget outlay of equal
amount to the taxpayer. Deductions for business expenses, on the other hand, are
not tax expenditures because an income tax necessarily requires a deduction for ex-
penses. See ALAN GUNN & LARRY D. WARD, CASES, TEXT AND PROBLEMS ON FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION 163-70 (5th ed. 2002). Thus, the Hope and Lifetime Learning
Credits and the § 222 deduction for qualified tuition and related expenses are tax
expenditures, while a deduction under Treasury Regulation § 1.162-5 for educational
expenses is not. The staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation project that 2005 tax
expenditures for the Hope and Lifetime Learning Credits and § 222 deduction for
qualified tuition and related expenses will total $5.2 billion and $2.8 billion, respec-
tively. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL
TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARs 2005-2009, at 35 (Joint Comm. Print 2005),
available at http://www.house.gov/jct/s-1-05.pdf.
4 See generally STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., PRESENT
LAW AND ANALYSIS RELATING TO TAX BENEFITS FOR HIGHER EDUCATION (Joint Comm.
Print 2004), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/x-52-04.pdf; INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., PUB. 970, TAX BENEFITS FOR EDUCATION (2004).
5 See I.R.C. § 530 (Lexis 2005).
6 See id. § 529.
7 See id. § 72(t)(2)(E) (2000).
8 See id. § 135 (Lexis 2005).
9 See id. § 221; id § 62(a) (17) (2000).
10 See id. § 108(f) (Lexis 2005).
11 See id. § 117 (2000 & Supp. I 2001).
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tional assistance program, 12 the nonrefundable Hope and Lifetime
Learning Credits, 13 a limited above-the-line deduction for tuition and
related expenses under § 222,14 and, the focus of this Note, a deduc-
tion for work-related education under § 162.15
Based on § 162, the Department of the Treasury16 promulgated
Treasury Regulation § 1.162-5 (the "Education Regulation"). Today,
the regulation looms as a monster within the education tax maze. As
this Note explores in greater detail, the regulation allows certain indi-
viduals engaged in carrying on a trade or a business a deduction for
educational expenses, provided that the education meets the tests ar-
ticulated by the regulation.
The staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation has recently urged
Congress to simplify the education tax maze that currently paralyzes
taxpayers. 17 More specifically, the staff proposed combining the
Hope and Lifetime Learning Credits"' and the § 222 deduction for
tuition and related expenses19 into a single credit.20 While commend-
12 See id. § 127.
13 See id. § 25A.
14 See id. § 222 (Lexis 2005); id § 62(a) (18) (Supp. I 2001).
15 See id. § 162(a) (2000); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (as amended in 1967). Employ-
ees may treat such amounts as a miscellaneous itemized deductions subject to the two
percent floor in § 67. Self-employed taxpayers, on the other hand, may qualify for an
above-the-line deduction under § 62(a) (1).
16 The Office of the Chief Counsel of the Internal Revenue Service or the Office
of Tax Policy of the Treasury largely write the Treasury Regulations, the second prin-
cipal source of tax rules. The Treasury issues most regulations as "interpretative regu-
lations" under § 7805(a) and courts defer to such regulations as long as they
reasonably implement the statute. If Congress expressly authorizes the Treasury to
write regulations, the regulations are referred to as "legislative regulations" and the
courts afford them even greater deference, overturning such regulations only if they
are plainly inconsistent with the statute. I STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION, PURSUANT TO SECTION 8022(3) (B) OF THE INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE OF 1986, at 49-50 (Joint Comm. Print 2001), available at http://
www.house.gov/jct/s-3-Olvoll .pdf.
17 See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., OPTIONS TO IM-
PROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES 42 (Joint Comm. Print 2005),
available at http://www.house.gov/jct/s-2-05.pdf. Congress has introduced legislation
to simplify the education tax maze. See, e.g., Education Tax Credit Simplification Act
of 2004, H.R. 4136, 108th Cong. (proposing an amendment to the Code to combine
the Hope and Lifetime Learning Credits and to provide a uniform definition of "qual-
ifying higher education expenses"). As of the date of this Note, however, Congress's
attempts have been unsuccessful.
18 See infra notes 22-39 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 40-52 and accompanying text.
20 See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 17, at 42.
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ing the staffs proposal to simplify these parts of the maze, this Note
focuses on the dangers of the forgotten Education Regulation
monster.
In an effort to provide the magic ball of thread, Part I examines
the three tax provisions the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation
proposed collapsing and highlights the evolution of the Code's treat-
ment of educational expenses under § 162, resulting in the Treasury
eventually issuing and later amending the regulation. Part II critiques
the regulation as applied by the courts and the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice (IRS). In particular, § 162's requirement that taxpayers engage
in "carrying on" a trade or business and the regulation's "upward-
bound" test that disallows a deduction for education that "leads to
qualifying" the taxpayer for a new trade or business impose overly con-
fusing and complicated limitations. In turn, the confusion and com-
plexities create difficulties for courts applying these standards, and,
combined with the intense fact-based inquiry the regulation requires,
generate considerable uncertainty for taxpayers considering deduct-
ing their educational expenses under § 162. As one might suspect,
this landscape provides a climate ripe for aggressive tax positions and
even tax evasion. In sum, the regulation represents an unworkable
tax incentive for higher education in the twenty-first century.
With the potential to break down socioeconomic and racial barri-
ers, to fulfill individual dreams, and to unleash waves of innovation
even greater than those of the last century, higher education clearly
provides lasting benefits both to individuals and society. Considering
the critical importance of higher education in the modern world, fed-
eral tax incentives for current higher education expenses should not
force students or their parents to enter a daunting tax maze or to
confront a monster. 21 Accordingly, this Note recommends that Con-
21 Individuals personally benefit from higher education. As one example, college
graduates typically earn significantly higher income over their working lives. SANDY
BAUM & KATHLEEN PAYEA, COLL. BD., EDUCATION PAYS 2004, at 9, available at http://
www.collegeboard.com/proddownloads/press/cost04/EducationPays2004.pdf One
commentator, however, appropriately states that "[t]o derive anyjustification at all for
governmental financial support from taxes compulsorily levied on all citizens, we
must be able to show, at least conceptually, just what general benefits the taxpayer who
secures no purely private consumption benefits receives from the outlays to higher
education." JAMES M. BUCHANAN, WHAT SHOULD ECONOMISTS Do? 257 (1979). Re-
cent studies establish that higher education provides significant societal benefits as
well. For example, higher education generally increases productivity, generates
higher tax payments from the additional earnings, reduces dependence on public
income transfer programs, improves quality of life, reduces unemployment and pov-
erty, and increases civic participation. BAUM & PAYEA, supra, at 9. Moreover, higher
education helps to fuel the economy and to maintain the United States' global com-
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gress legislatively slay the monster by disallowing a deduction under
§ 162 for educational expenses paid or incurred by a degree-seeking
taxpayer at an eligible educational institution and dismantle parts of
the maze by implementing the staff of the Joint Committee's proposal
to collapse § 25A and § 222 into one unified education tax credit for
higher education.
I. SURVEYING THE MAZE AND THE MONSTER
While the birth of the Education Regulation monster dates back
to 1958, the Hope and Lifetime Learning Credits and the above-the-
line deduction for qualified tuition and related expenses are relatively
recent statutory creations found within § 25A and § 222 respectively.
Accordingly, Part L.A briefly analyzes § 25A and § 222, the parts of the
tax maze the staff of the Joint Committee proposed simplifying, de-
scribes their interplay, and, most importantly, offers a glimpse of their
collective complexity. Part I.B focuses on the Education Regulation
monster to provide a foundation for critiquing the weaknesses of the
regulation.
A. The Construction of the Maze
1. The Hope Scholarship Credit and the Lifetime Learning Credit
The Taxpayer Relief Act of 199722 contains several of Congress's
most significant tax incentives for higher education, including two im-
portant nonrefundable tax credits, the Hope Scholarship Credit and
the Lifetime Learning Credit.23 At the same time, these tax provisions
have generated significant criticism because of their considerable
complexity.24
petitiveness in the twenty-first century. Accordingly, this Note accepts the premise
that higher education provides significant societal benefit, justifying a simple and ef-
fective unified education tax credit.
22 Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
26 U.S.C.).
23 I.R.C. § 25A (2000 & Supp. I 2001); see also GUNN & WARD, supra note 3, at 171
n.d. ("For reasons not explained in the committee reports, the names 'Hope Scholar-
ship Credit' and 'Lifetime Learning Credit' are capitalized, unlike the names of other
credits. This may reflect the profound importance of these credits, in comparison
with all the others. Or it may not.").
24 See, e.g., Glenn E. Coven, Bad Drafting-A Case Study of the Design and Implemen-
tation of the Income Tax Subsidies for Education, 54 TAX LAw. 1, 2 (2001) (arguing that
the legislation creating the Hope Scholarship Credit, the Lifetime Learning Credit,
and the Educational Individual Retirement Accounts are "really poorly drafted and
the resulting deterioration in the quality of the taxation statute results in unaccept-
able costs").
1989
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
The Hope Credit, codified at § 25A(b), is a nonrefundable credit
per student per year equal to 100% of the first $1000 of qualified tui-
tion and related expenses and fifty percent of the next $1000 paid for
a student's education for the first two years of postsecondary educa-
tion (i.e., first two years of undergraduate studies). 25 The sister credit
found in § 25A(c), the Lifetime Learning Credit, is a nonrefundable
credit as well, but calculated per taxpayer (i.e., family wide) per year for
an unlimited number of years (i.e., both undergraduate and graduate
studies) and equals twenty percent of qualified tuition and related ex-
penses not exceeding $10,000.26 Both credits are phased out for
higher-income taxpayers with modified adjusted gross incomes be-
tween $43,000 and $53,000 ($87,000 and $107,000 for married taxpay-
ers filing a joint return) for 2005.27
To be eligible for the Hope Credit, a student must enroll in a
"degree, certificate, or other program ... leading to a recognized edu-
cational credential at an [eligible] institution of higher education...
and not be enrolled in an elementary or secondary school,"28 and
carry at least one half the normal full-time workload for at least one
academic period.29 Moreover, students convicted of a felony drug of-
fense cannot claim the Hope Credit.30 For both credits, neither mar-
25 I.R.C. § 25A(b) (2000). Beginning in 2001, each of the $1000 amounts are
adjusted as a result of inflation and rounded to the next lowest multiple of $100. Id.
§ 25A(h).
26 Id. § 25A(c). Unlike the Hope Credit, these amounts are not adjusted for in-
flation. See supra note 25.
27 I.R.C. § 25A(d). The phase-out calculation itself is rather daunting:
The amount which would (but for this subsection) be taken into account...
shall be reduced (but not below zero) by . . . the amount which bears the
same ratio to the amount which would be so taken into account as ... the
excess of the taxpayer's modified adjusted gross income for such taxable
year, over $40,000 ($80,000 in the case of a joint return), bears to . . .
$10,000 ($20,000 in the case of a joint return).
Id. Therefore, during 2005 taxpayers with modified adjusted gross income in excess
of $53,000 ($107,000 in the case ofjoint returns) may not claim the Hope Credit or
Lifetime Learning Credit. Treas. Reg. § 1.25A-1 (c) (1) (2002). Note that these phase-
out amounts are indexed for inflation beginning after 2001 and the 2005 amounts are
referred to in the text. I.R.C. § 25A(h) (2).
28 I.R.C. § 25A(b) (3) (A); see also Higher Education Act of 1965 § 484(a) (1), 20
U.S.C. § 1091(a) (1) (2000).
29 I.R.C. § 25A(b) (3) (B).
30 For reasons Congress did not explain, the strict "no drug" policy applies only
to the Hope Credit. Query why Congress adopted this policy for the Hope Credit, a
credit targeted to community college students, but not for the Lifetime Learning
Credit. Furthermore, Congress failed to explain why offering an education incentive
for students with a history of drug abuse would be a bad policy, while students con-
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ried taxpayers who do not file a joint tax return nor nonresident
aliens can claim the credits. 31
The Code defines "qualified tuition and related expenses" as tui-
tion and fees required for enrollment or attendance by the taxpayer,
spouse, or any dependent at an eligible educational institution.3 2 This
definition, however, excludes not only expenses for any course involv-
ing sports, games, or hobbies (unless part of the student's degree pro-
gram), but also student activity fees, athletic fees, insurance, and other
expenses unrelated to the student's academic studies. 33 Qualified tui-
tion and related expenses paid by dependents are treated as paid by
the taxpayer claiming the personal exemption for the dependent.
34
Accordingly, determining who can claim the student as a dependent,
and thus claim the credit, adds even further complexity. 35 Because
only if the taxpayer actually claims the personal exemption for a stu-
dent does the taxpayer receive the credit, the taxpayer must deter-
mine whether the taxpayer or the dependent-student would receive
the greatest tax benefit from the Hope or Lifetime Learning Credit to
decide whether to claim the personal exemption.3 6
Section 25A contains special provisions dealing with the interac-
tion of other educational tax incentives. Taxpayers must reduce quali-
fied tuition and related expenses by the amount of qualified
scholarships and fellowships or employer-provided educational assis-
tance excluded from gross income.37 In addition, if a taxpayer claims
a Hope Credit with respect to a student, then amounts paid to educate
that student are ineligible for the Lifetime Learning Credit. 38 Finally,
taxpayers cannot claim the Hope or Lifetime Learning Credits for any
educational expenses for which the taxpayer claims a deduction
under any other section of the Code. 39
victed of other crimes, such as murder, should receive a tax benefit. See Coven, supra
note 24, at 33.
31 Id. § 25A(b) (2) (D), (g)(6)-( 7 ).
32 Id. § 25A(f) (1) (A).
33 Id. § 25A(f)(1)(B)-(C).
34 Id. § 25A(g) (3).
35 See id. § 25A(f) (A), (g)( 3 ).
36 See id. § 25A(g) (3).
37 Id. § 25A(g) (2).
38 Id. § 25A(c) (2) (A).
39 Id. § 25A(g) (5).
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2. The § 222 Deduction for Qualified Tuition and Related
Expenses
Section 222, enacted in 2001, represents the latest addition to
Congress's educational tax incentive family. This provision allows a
taxpayer to claim an above-the-line deduction for qualified tuition
and related expenses paid during the year.40 This new education de-
duction incorporates § 25A's definition of qualified tuition and re-
lated expenses, which generally includes required tuition and fees for
the taxpayer, spouse, or any dependents. 41 Section 222 operates only
as a temporary provision and will expire after 2005.42
The education deduction contains an interesting three-step limi-
tation mechanism for higher-income taxpayers. For 2004 and 2005, if
the taxpayer's adjusted gross income 43 does not exceed $65,000 (or
$130,000 for married taxpayers filing a joint return), the maximum
deduction is $4000. If the taxpayer's adjusted gross income does not
exceed $80,000 (or $160,000 for married taxpayers filing a joint re-
turn), the maximum deduction is $2000. Taxpayers with adjusted
gross income in excess of $80,000 (or $160,000 for married taxpayers
filing a joint return) cannot claim a deduction. 44 Because a single
taxpayer who has adjusted gross income of $80,000 may deduct up to
$2000 while a single taxpayer who has adjusted gross income of
$80,001 cannot deduct anything, the § 222 provides an extreme exam-
ple of the "cliff effect."45
Like the educational tax provisions discussed previously, § 222
provides detailed rules to coordinate the deduction with other Code
sections. In particular, the taxpayer must reduce qualified tuition and
related expenses by scholarships or employer-provided educational as-
sistance excluded from the taxpayer's gross income.46 Moreover,
§ 222 requires taxpayers to reduce qualified tuition and related ex-
penses by funds from various other tax preferred educational savings
vehicles, including income from U.S. savings bonds used to pay quali-
fied higher education expenses and certain distributions from 529
Plans and Coverdell Education Savings Accounts. 47 Section 222 also
prohibits a taxpayer from claiming the education deduction for a stu-
40 Id. § 222(b) (Supp. I 2001).
41 See id. § 222(d); see also id. § 25A(f), (g)(2) (2000).
42 Id. § 222(e) (Supp. I 2001).
43 As defined exclusively for this provision by id. § 222(b) (2) (C) (Lexis 2005).
44 Id. § 222(b) (2) (B) (Supp. I 2001).
45 Ira B. Shepard & Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Recent Developments in Federal Income
Taxation: The Year 2001, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 627, 701 (2002).
46 I.R.C. § 222(d)(1).
47 Id. § 222(c)(2)(B).
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dent if the taxpayer elects to claim the Hope Credit or Lifetime Learn-
ing Credit.48 Lastly, § 222 contains a general provision denying a
deduction under § 222 for any educational expenses the taxpayer de-
ducts under other Code provisions, including § 162.49
Similar to the education tax credits, § 222 denies the deduction
for educational expenses to taxpayers married and filing separate tax
returns, 50 and nonresident aliens. 5I Unlike the Hope and Lifetime
Learning Credits, however, § 222 denies a deduction for any individ-
ual if his or her personal exemption is allowable to another taxpayer,
whether or not the taxpayer actually claims the personal exemption. 52
The brief discussion above only begins to describe the ghastly de-
tails and inordinate complexities of § 25A and § 222. If the individual
Code provisions do not overwhelm taxpayers enough, they need only
consider the collective complexities of the various tax incentives. In-
deed, taxpayers should calculate the tax benefit for the educational
expenses under § 25A, § 222 and, as discussed below, the Education
Regulation to determine which section, or combination of sections,
affords the greatest tax savings.53 Consider the confusion when tax-
payers have more than one qualified student or, for purposes of
§ 25A, must determine who receives the greatest tax benefit from the
Hope or Lifetime Learning Credit to decide whether to claim the per-
sonal exemption for a dependent-student. Moreover, the various ad-
justed gross income phase-outs and the lack of any uniform definition
of qualified educational expenditures within the Code54 makes navi-
gating the maze even more difficult for taxpayers attempting to com-
pare various tax benefits. Consequently, § 25A and § 222 collectively
form complex parts of the education tax maze.
48 Id. § 222(c) (2) (A).
49 Id. § 222(c)(1).
50 Id. § 222(d) (4).
51 Id. § 222(d) (5).
52 Id. § 222(c)(3).
53 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 4, at 60 (instructing taxpayers to
"[flirst, figure your taxes using the expenses as business deductions. Then, figure
your taxes again using any of the other deductions and credits for which you qualify.
You may find that a combination of credit(s) and deduction(s) gives you the lowest
tax.").
54 For a helpful table comparing the Code's various definitions of educational
expenses, see STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 4, at 46-47. For
further analysis of the inconsistent Code definitions in the education context, see also
AmyJ. Oliver, Improving the Tax Code to Provide Meaningful and Effective Tax Incentives for
Higher Education, 12 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 91, 129-37 (2000).
1993
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
B. Tracing the Evolution of the Monster
Section 162 of the Code generally allows a taxpayer to deduct "all
the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxa-
ble year in carrying on any trade or business." 55 Even though this
section's broad language would appear to encompass almost any edu-
cational expense connected with a trade or business, the regulation,
first issued by the Department of the Treasury in 1958 and later
amended in 1967, significantly narrows the scope of § 162 in the con-
text of educational expenses. The regulation attempts to filter out
deductible educational expenses under § 162 from nondeductible
personal expenses under § 26256 and capital expenditures 5 7 by articu-
lating two affirmative tests and two disallowance tests. 58
55 I.R.C. § 162(a) (2000). For a more in-depth analysis of Code § 162 and the
development of Treasury Regulation § 1.162-5, see Marcus Schoenfeld, The Educa-
tional Expense Deduction: The Need for a Rational Approach, 27 ViLE. L. REV. 237 (1982).
56 I.R.C. § 262 (denying a tax deduction for "personal, living, or family
expenses").
57 No general Code section specifies a rule to distinguish capital expenditures,
but the capitalization principal arises from a number of scattered Code sections. See,
e.g., id. § 195 (Lexis 2005) (disallowing a deduction for business "start-up expendi-
tures"); id. § 263(a)(1)-(2) (denying a deduction for amounts "paid out for new
buildings or for permanent improvements or betterments made to increase the value
of any property or estate" and "restoring property or in making the exhaustion
thereof for which an allowance is or has been made"); id. § 263A (specifying that the
taxpayer must capitalize the "proper share" of "indirect" costs of property produced
or acquired for resale); id. § 446(b) (2000) (requiring that a taxpayer's accounting
method "clearly reflect income"), id. § 1012 (defining the basis of property as "cost");
id. § 1016(a) (1) (requiring adjustment for expenditures "properly chargeable to capi-
tal account"); see also GUNN & WARD, supra note 3, at 270 (discussing the statutory
roots of the "capitalization" requirements).
58 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a)-(b) (as amended in 1967). Ultimately, the regula-
tion's attempt to classify educational expenditures into these categories and the un-
derlying assumption that taxpayers, the IRS, and courts can appropriatley make this
classification underlie the difficulties discussed in Part II. Classification of educa-
tional expenditures ultimately flows from Congress's legislative decision to tax net
income, rather than gross income or consumption. See I.R.C. § 1 (a)-(d) (imposing
the tax rate on taxable income); id. § 63(a) (generally defining taxable income as
gross income minus allowable deductions); see also 1 BoRRIs I. BITrER & LAWRENCE
LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTs 1 20.1.1, at 20-3 (3d ed.
1999) (noting that the Constitution does not require allowances for the cost of earn-
ing income). One legal scholar asserts that while Congress must allow a deduction for
business expenses to effectively tax "net income," Congress must disallow deductions
for personal expenses to prevent erosion to the tax base from personal living expendi-
tures and to protect the notion of taxing economic gains. MARVIN A. CHIREL.STEIN,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 7.01, at 177 (9th ed. 2002). In the context of educa-
tional expenditures, however, these distinctions impose a difficult, if not impossible,
[VOL. 8o:51994
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The following analysis traces the early federal tax treatment of
educational expenses under § 162, which evolved first into a "subjec-
tive" standard before becoming an "objective" standard under the cur-
rent Education Regulation.
1. The Pre-Regulation Era: The Shaky Beginning
Almost from the beginning of the federal income tax system, the
IRS and courts considered educational endeavors presumptively, if
not per se, personal expenses and, therefore, disallowed any tax de-
duction under § 162. 59 In the mid-1920s, however, the Board of Tax
Appeals signaled a change of course in Shutter v. Commissioner60 by
allowing a minister to deduct the cost of attending an essential church
convention. Two years later, the Board reached a similar decision in
Silverman v. Commissioner,61 holding that a college professor could de-
duct the cost of attending a professional convention. In response, in
1933 the IRS issued General Counsel's Memorandum 11,654, which
allowed a limited deduction for certain expenses incurred by college
professors to attend professional conventions. 62
The theoretical debate over whether educational costs were capi-
tal expenditures or current expenses largely marked the next stage of
development.63 In Welch v. Helvering,64 Justice Benjamin Cardozo sug-
gested in dictum that the cost of an education could qualify as a busi-
ness-related expense rather than a personal expense, but indicated
challenge for taxpayers, the IRS and courts. See 1 BITrKER & LOKKEN, supra, 1 22.1.1,
at 22-5.
59 See, e.g., O.D. 892, 1921-4 C.B. 209, obsoleted by Rev. Rul. 69-31, 1969-1 C.B. 307
(stating that educational expenses incurred by school teachers attending summer
courses were personal in nature and nondeductible); O.D. 894, 1921-5 C.B. 171, ob-
soleted by Rev. Rul. 69-31, 1969-1 C.B. 307 (concluding that educational expenses paid
by doctors pursuing post-graduate courses were personal and, thus, nondeductible);
I.T. 1520, 1-2 C.B. 145-46 (1922), revoked by I.T. 2688, XII-1 C.B. 251 (1933) (charac-
terizing a college professor's research expenses that were encouraged by the college
but not required as nondeductible personal expenses); Driscoll Appeal, 4 B.T.A.
1008, 1009 (1926) (denying a professional singer a deduction for the cost of voice
lessons because the expenses were personal); Darling v. Comm'r, 4 B.T.A. 499, 504
(1926), acq. VI-1 C.B. 2 (disallowing a cartoonist from deducting the cost to study and
practice sculpture because the expenses were "purely educational").
60 2 B.T.A. 23 (1925), acq. IV-2 C.B. 4.
61 6 B.T.A. 1328 (1927), acq. VI-2 C.B. 6.
62 Gen. Couns. Mem. 11,654 (1933).
63 This debate substantially influenced the requirements later articulated in Trea-
sury Regulation § 1.162-5.
64 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
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that such costs more accurately represented a capital expenditure. In
an oft-quoted passage, Justice Cardozo stated:
Reputation and learning are akin to capital assets, like the good will of
an old partnership. For many, they are the only tools with which to
hew a pathway to success. The money spent in acquiring them is
well and wisely spent. It is not an ordinary expense of the operation of a
business.65
Following Justice Cardozo's proposition in Welch that linked educa-
tion to capital expenditures, the Tax Court, in at least one case, de-
nied a deduction for educational costs at least in part on the grounds
that such payments represented nondeductible capital
expenditures. 66
Decided in 1950, Hill v. Commissioner67 was the first case in which
a court permitted a deduction under § 162 for educational expenses
for formal instruction rather than professional conventions or re-
search expenses. At that time, Virginia law required school teachers
to renew their license by either obtaining college credits or passing an
examination on five selected books.68 Petitioner Nora Payne Hill
chose to attend summer school at Columbia University to meet the
requirements to renew her teaching license. 69 In reversing the Tax
Court's decision, the Fourth Circuit held Hill could deduct the educa-
tional costs because they "were incurred in carrying on a trade or busi-
ness, were ordinary and necessary, and were not personal in nature."70
The court found Hill incurred the educational expenses to "maintain
her present position, not to attain a new position; to preserve, not to
expand or increase; to carry on, not to commence." 71 Notably, the
court appeared to ignore the expense versus capital expenditure issue
Justice Cardozo raised in Welch. Following its loss in Hill, the IRS soon
released a pronouncement that afforded a limited deduction to teach-
ers attending summer courses. 72 Accordingly, Hill signaled a new era
65 Id. at 115-16 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
66 See, e.g., Osborn v. Comm'r, 3 T.C. 603, 605 (1944) (denying a deduction for
research expenses incurred by a college professor who received no compensation
while conducting the research and noting that "[t]he expenses incurred in preparing
himself are in essence the cost of the capital structure from which his future income is
to be derived").
67 181 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1950).
68 Id. at 907-08.
69 Id. at 908.
70 Id. at 911.
71 Id. at 909. Ultimately, the court's language provided the framework for the
soon-to-be-released Treasury Regulation.
72 I.T. 4044, 1951-1 C.B. 16.
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by overturning the longstanding presumption that education was per-
sonal in nature and allowing a limited deduction for certain educa-
tional expenses.
2. The 1958 Treasury Regulation: The Subjective Phase
While the IRS and the Tax Court construed Hill and the subse-
quent IRS pronouncements narrowly, 73 the Second Circuit further
questioned the proposition that educational expenses were nonde-
ductible personal expenses in Coughlin v. Commissioner.74 Coughlin, a
general legal practitioner, agreed to handle cases involving federal tax
issues. Although his firm did not require him to do so as a condition
of his continued employment, Coughlin attended an annual tax insti-
tute to stay abreast on the latest tax developments and deducted the
tuition and travel costs as a business expense. The Second Circuit,
reversing the Tax Court, held that Coughlin could deduct tuition and
travel costs under § 162 because he had a "professional duty to keep
sharp the tools he actually used in his going trade or business. ' 75 In-
fluenced by the court's decision in Coughlin, in 1958 the Department
of the Treasury promulgated Treasury Regulation § 1.162-5,76 which
"constituted the first systematic analysis of many of the problems in-
herent in the area of educational expenditures and, in general,
greatly liberalized deductibility." 77
Under the 1958 regulation, a taxpayer could deduct educational
expenses if the taxpayer satisfied either of two affirmative tests and did
not violate the regulation's disallowance tests. For an expense to qual-
ify under the affirmative tests, the taxpayer must have undertaken the
education "primarily for the purpose" of either (1) "[m] aintaining or
improving skills required by the taxpayer in his employment or other
trade or business" or (2) "[in] eeting the express requirements of a
taxpayer's employer or the requirements of applicable law or regula-
tions, imposed as a condition to the retention by the taxpayer of his
salary, status or employment. '78 The regulation's disallowance tests,
however, prohibited a deduction for educational expenses if either
(1) the taxpayer undertook the education "primarily for the purpose"
of either "obtaining a new position or substantial advancement in po-
73 See Schoenfeld, supra note 55, at 249-55.
74 203 F.2d 307, 309 (2d Cir. 1953).
75 Id.
76 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (1958).
77 Schoenfeld, supra note 55, at 255 (citations omitted).
78 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a)(2). This Note will generally refer to both factors in
Treasury Regulation § 1.162-5 that allow a deduction for educational expenses as the
"affirmative tests."
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sition" or "fulfilling the general educational aspirations or other per-
sonal purpose of the taxpayer ' 79 or (2) the education was "required of
the taxpayer in order to meet the minimum requirements for qualifi-
cation or establishment in his intended trade or business or specialty
therein."8 0
The 1958 regulation represented a fundamental change in the
IRS's treatment of educational costs.81 The primary purpose stan-
dard, however, proved unworkable. First, the issue of the taxpayer's
primary purpose was a question of fact and, therefore, courts often
reached seemingly contradictory conclusions in nearly identical
cases.8 2 Moreover, appellate courts could not easily articulate coher-
ent standards, in part because the issues were factual decisions gener-
ally immune from appellate review.83 To the extent that the 1958
regulation established that taxpayers could deduct certain educational
expenses under § 162, however, the regulation successfully fulfilled its
purpose.
3. The Current Treasury Regulation: The Objective Phase
In 1967, the Department of the Treasury replaced the 1958 regu-
lation with the current Education Regulation.8 4 Similar to the 1958
79 Id. § 1.162-5(b).
80 Id. This Note will refer to the two factors in Treasury Regulation § 1.162-5 that
deny a deduction for educational expenses as the "disallowance tests."
81 Although the 1958 regulations represented a change, the 1956 proposed regu-
lation maintained the presumptively personal taint. "In general, a taxpayer's expendi-
tures for his education are personal and are not deductible." Prop. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.162-5(a)(1), 26 Fed. Reg. 5091, 5093 (July 10, 1956).
82 Schoenfeld, supra note 55, at 260.
83 Id.
84 The relevant parts of the 1967 Treasury Regulation § 1.162-5 provide:
(a) General Rule. Expenditures made by an individual for education (in-
cluding research undertaken as part of his educational program) which are
not expenditures of a type described in paragraph (b) (2) or (3) of this sec-
tion are deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses (even
though the education may lead to a degree) if the education-
(1) Maintains or improves skills required by the individual in his em-
ployment or other trade or business, or
(2) Meets the express requirements of the individual's employer, or the
requirements of applicable law or regulations, imposed as a condition to the
retention by the individual of an established employment relationship, sta-
tus, or rate of compensation.
(b) Nondeductible educational expenditures-(1) In general Educational
expenditures described in subparagraphs (2) and (3) of this paragraph are
personal expenditures or constitute an inseparable aggregate of personal
and capital expenditures and, therefore, are not deductible as ordinary and
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regulation, the 1967 regulation incorporates two disallowance tests,
85
sometimes referred to as the "entry level" and the "upward-bound"
tests,8 6 which automatically prohibit a deduction under § 162. Gener-
ally, the entry level test disallows a deduction under § 162 for any edu-
cation required to meet the minimum educational requirements for
qualification in the taxpayer's trade or business.87 The upward-bound
test, on the other hand, prohibits a deduction for any education that
is part of a program of study that will lead to qualifying the taxpayer
for a new trade or business.88
The 1967 regulation also substantially carried over the two affirm-
ative tests89 found in the 1958 regulation, referred to as the "skill-
maintenance" and the "employer-mandate" standards.90 Under the
skill-maintenance standard, a taxpayer can deduct educational ex-
penses that "maintain or improve skills required by the individual in
his employment or trade or business."91 In the alternative, a taxpayer
can deduct educational expenses under the employer-mandate stan-
dard if the education "[m]eets the express requirements of the
necessary business expenses even though the education may maintain or im-
prove skills required by the individual in his employment or other trade or
business or may meet the express requirements of the individual's employer
or of applicable law or regulations.
(2) Minimum Educational Requirements. (i) The first category of nonde-
ductible educational expenses within the scope of subparagraph (1) of this
paragraph are expenditures made by an individual for education which is
required of him in order to meet the minimum educational requirements
for qualification in his employment or other trade or business.
(3) Qualification for a new trade or business. (i) The second category of
nondeductible educational expenses within the scope of subparagraph (1)
of this paragraph are expenditures made by an individual for education
which is part of a program of study being pursued by him which will lead to
qualifying him in a new trade or business. In the case of an employee, a
change of duties does not constitute a new trade or business if the new du-
ties involve the same general type of work as is involved in the individual's
present employment.
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a)-(b) (as amended in 1967).
85 Id. § 1.162-5(b).
86 1 BITrKER & LOKKEN, supra iote 58, 22.1.3, at 22-10 to 22-11.
87 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(2).
88 Id. § 1.162-5(b) (3).
89 Id. § 1.162-5(a).
90 1 BnTrKER & LoKKEN, supra note 58, 22.1.2, at 22-6.
91 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a) (1).
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individual's employer, or the requirements of applicable law or regu-
lations" imposed as a condition to retaining an employment relation-
ship, status, or rate of compensation. 92
In an attempt to clarify the confusing interplay between the af-
firmative and disallowance tests, the current regulation emphasizes
the primacy of the disallowance tests.93 In fact, taxpayers can only test
educational expenses under the affirmative tests if those expenses can
first pass the disallowance tests.
The 1967 regulation, without further explanation, also elimi-
nated the "no specialty" test incorporated into the 1958 regulation's
disallowance test.94 For example, under the previous regulation, if a
general medical practitioner took courses to specialize in pediatrics,
the upward-bound test denied a deduction for the educational ex-
penses.9 5 Under the current regulation, as a comparable example, a
psychiatrist who undertakes a program of study that qualifies the psy-
chiatrist for the specialized practice of psychoanalysis does not fail the
upward-bound test.96
Most importantly, the current regulation boasts an objective stan-
dard intended to replace the 1958 regulation's unworkable subjective
"primary purpose" test.9 7 If the education leads to qualifying the tax-
payer for a new trade or business, evidence that the taxpayer never
intended to enter such trade or business is irrelevant under the 1967
92 Id. § 1.162-5(a)(2).
93 See id. § 1.162-5(a) (stating that "[eixpenditures ... which are not expendi-
tures of a type described in paragraph (b) (2) or (3) of this section are deductible");
see also id. § 1.162-5(c) (1)-(2) (emphasizing that in no event may a taxpayer deduct
educational expenses that fall within the disallowance tests, even if the education satis-
fies the affirmative tests).
94 SeeTreas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b) (1958) (disallowing a deduction if the education is
required to meet the minimum requirements for qualification in the "intended trade
or business or specialty therein").
95 Id. § 1.162-5(e) ex. 2 (stating that a general practitioner of medicine could not
deduct courses in pediatrics because "the course of study qualified him for a specialty
within his trade or business").
96 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b) (3) (ii) ex. 4 (as amended in 1967) (concluding that a
psychiatrist could deduct the cost of studying psychoanalysis because it "maintains or
improves skills required by him in his trade or business and does not qualify him for a
new trade or business"). Furthermore, the elimination of the specialty test potentially
allows lawyers to deduct the educational costs related to obtaining specialized degrees
such as an LL.M. See, e.g., Ralph Conley Salyer, Jr., Lawyers Going Back to School It's All
Tax Deductible, ME. B.J., Jan. 1992, at 40.
97 Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (as amended in 1967), with Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5
(1958).
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regulation. 98 The 1958 regulation, on the other hand, relied on the
primary purpose approach and, therefore, the taxpayer's subjective
intent and purpose was often the determining factor. For example,
under the 1958 regulation, a taxpayer could deduct educational ex-
penses even if the education qualified the taxpayer for a new trade or
business as long as the taxpayer could establish the primary purpose
of undertaking the education was to maintain or improve the skills
required by the employer and not to obtain a new position.99 Un-
doubtedly, this transformation represents the most significant change
to the current regulation.
The following chart summarizes the general requirements of the
current Education Regulation and demonstrates the interplay of the
affirmative and disallowance tests.
FIGURE 1.
Start Here
Entn-Level TetUlward-Bound Test
yes Is the education required to meet No Is the education part of a No
the minimum educational program of study that will lead to
requirements of the taxpayer's qualifying the taxpayer for a new
present trade or business? trade or business?
Yes
The education is nt sdeductible
under Treas. Reg. § 1. 162-5
The education is deductible ufor
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5
Yes Yes
o SkillMaintenance Standard Empl° er'Mandate Sadr
Does or the cotiof anin la hl e education required by theimprove skills needed in the taxpayer's employer or the law to
No taxpayer's present work? No keep the taxpayer's present salary,
status or job?
11. ATTACKING THE EDUCATION REGULATION MONSTER
While commentators have long called for simplification of the tax
maze, they often forget the monster within the maze. Most recently,
the staff of the joint Committee on Taxation advised Congress to sim-
98 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1. 162-5 (b) (3) ex. 2 (as amended in 1967) (disallowing a
deduction for the cost of attending law school even though the taxpayer intends to
continue employment in a nonlegal profession).
99 See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a)-(b) (1958).
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plify the education tax maze by collapsing the § 25A Hope and Life-
time Learning Credits and the above-the-line deduction in § 222 for
qualified tuition and related expenses into a single nonrefundable tax
credit.'00 These proposals for simplification, while commendable,
largely focus on dismantling the maze without considering the Educa-
tion Regulation monster that has long haunted its inner corridors.
Those commentators who do recognize the monster have
mounted attacks from several different fronts. 101 First, commentators
have called for the demise of the regulation because it fails to properly
treat investments in "human capital" as capital expenditures and de-
nies amortization for the cost over the useful life of the education. 102
Second, at least one professor argues the regulation is an unreasona-
ble interpretation of § 162(a) and plainly inconsistent with this provi-
sion. 10 3 Third, and more recently, one law professor critiques the
regulation primarily because nothing in the Code restricts a deduc-
tion for educational costs and, therefore, the same standard should
100 See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 17, at 42.
101 Notwithstanding the united attack by scholars, lawyers, and taxpayers, courts
have unanimously upheld the validity of the regulation. See, e.g., Melnick v. United
States, 521 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding Treasury Regulation § 1.162-5 was not
unconstitutional on Fifth Amendment due process grounds); Taubman v. Comm'r,
60 T.C. 814 (1973) (dismissing the taxpayer's argument that Treasury Regulation§ 1.162-5 unconstitutionally discriminated in favor of teachers over other profession-
als); Weiszmann v. Comm'r, 52 T.C. 1106, 1111 (1969), affd per curiam, 443 F.2d 29(9th Cir. 1971) (concluding the regulation was not inconsistent with § 162).
102 See, e.g., Bernard Wolfman, Professors and the "Ordinary and Necessary" Business
Expense, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 1089, 1112 (1964) (stating that courts and the IRS have
"too rarely differentiated between the capital educational expenditure and the per-
sonal. They have been unmindful of Justice Cardozo's analysis in Welch v. Helvering
which suggested . . . that when the purpose of such education is to get started in
business, the cost must be capitalized"); Brian E. Lebowitz, On the Mistaxation of Invest-
ment in Human Capita4 52 TAX NoTEs 825 (1991) (criticizing the Code's discrimina-
tion of investments in human capital); Hamish P.M. Hume, Note, The Business of
Learning: When and How the Cost of Education Should Be Recognized, 81 VA. L. REV. 887,
887 (1995) (arguing that the tax rules should capitalize educational expenses andprovide a deduction for amortization); Richard C. Spencer, Comment, The Deductibil-
ity of Educational Expenses: Administrative Construction of Statute, 17 Burr. L. REV. 182,
209 (1968) (arguing that the "education which [the professional] must acquire, per-haps three or four years of professional schooling, is a capital asset, albeit intangible,
under all common definitions of that term"); David C. Tarshes, Comment, 1980 DuKE
L.J. 997, 1021 (stating that "[t]he major flaw in section 1.162-5 is not its inconsistency,
its broad definition of 'new trade,' or its susceptibility to subjective considerations, but
rather its failure to comport with a theoretically sound treatment of educational ex-
penses as capital expenditures").
103 Schoenfeld, supra note 55, at 314.
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apply to educational expenses as other business expenses.' 0 4 Con-
gress has even recognized, in passing, the weaknesses of the regula-
tion,10 5 but rather than confront the monster, it added further
complex incentives for higher education and, thus, constructed new
levels on the tax maze.
This Note renews the attack on the Education Regulation mon-
ster by critiquing elements of the regulation primarily through the
lens of cornerstone principles of good tax policy: certainty and sim-
plicity. 10 6 In particular, the following section analyzes the Code's
104 Jay Katz, The Deductibility of Educational Costs: Why Does Congress Allow the IRS to
Take Your Education So Personally?, 17 VA. TAX REv. 1, 3 (1997).
105 See S. REP. No. 95-1263, at 100 (1978) (stating that "[b]ecause ambiguities exist
in the 'improve or maintain skills' test imposed under [Treasury Regulation §1.162-
5], the taxability of educational assistance programs of particular employers necessa-
rily depends on IRS agents' case-by-case analyses of the skills needed for the jobs held
by each employee participating in such programs"); see also STAFF OF THEJOINT COMM.
ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED IN
THE 107TH CONGRESS 46 (Joint Comm. Print 2003) (observing that "[b]ecause the
determination of whether particular educational assistance is job related is based on
the facts and circumstances, it may be difficult to determine with certainty whether
the educational assistance is excludable from income. This uncertainty may lead to
disputes between taxpayers and the Internal Revenue Service."); STAFF OF THE JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAx LEGISLATION EN-
ACTED IN THE 106TH CONGRESS 24 (Joint Comm. Print 2001) (same).
106 In general, the principles of certainty and simplicity are related. If a tax provi-
sion is complex or confusing, that provision will often be uncertain as well. Although
scholars and policymakers do not universally agree on the criteria by which to evalu-
ate a tax system, Adam Smith suggested four general maxims of good tax policy that
broadly encompass the principles of certainty and simplicity: (1) Equality, which dic-
tates that "[t]he subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the
government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities"; (2) Cer-
tainty, which requires that "[t] he tax which each individual is bound to pay ought to
be certain, and not arbitrary. The time of payment, the manner of payment, the quan-
tity to be paid, ought all to be clear and plain to the contributor, and to every other
person"; (3) Convenience of payment, which provides that "[e]very tax ought to be lev-
ied at the time, or in the manner, in which it is most likely to be convenient for the
contributor to pay it"; and (4) Economy of collection, which states that "[e]very tax ought
to be so contrived as both to take out and to keep out of the pockets of the people as
little as possible, over and above what it brings into the public treasury of the state."
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
888-90 (Edwin Cannan ed., Random House, Inc. 1994) (1776). Professors Richard
K Vedder and Lowell E. Gallaway, in a report prepared for the Joint Economic Com-
mittee, identified similar underlying principles of tax policy, concluding that a good
tax is (1) "Not costly for either government or taxpayers to calculate or administer; on
the other hand, tax avoidance is difficult and risky"; (2) "Neutral in its impact on
resource allocation decisions, minimizing negative effects on economic growth; it
does not lead to unproductive economic activity that is tax-induced"; (3) "Fair; people
believe that the tax burden is equitably distributed amongst the tax-paying popula-
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threshold "carrying on any trade or business" 10 7 test and the regula-
tion's upward-bound disallowance test' 08-the primary pitfalls when
applying the regulation-in light of these principles. As the following
discussion reveals, the "carrying on" requirement and the upward-
bound test are often confusing and difficult standards to apply for
both taxpayers and courts, causing special uncertainty surrounding
the application of these standards in addition to the inherent uncer-
tainty flowing from the required fact-based inquiry. As expected,
these combined failings encourage taxpayers to play the "audit lot-
tery" and aggressively claim a deduction for educational expenses
even when the education probably does not pass the regulation's rigid
tests.
A. The "Carrying on" Requirement
Individuals must not only satisfy the Education Regulation's re-
quirements to deduct educational expenses, but must also meet
§ 162(a)'s threshold "carrying on any trade or business" test.10 9 Al-
though the Code does not define a "trade or business," the United
States Supreme Court recently held that "[t]o be engaged in a trade
or business, the taxpayer must .be involved in the activity with con-
tinuity and regularity and that the taxpayer's primary purpose for en-
gaging in the activity must be for income or profit."110 Because the
performance of services as an employee constitutes a "trade or busi-
ness,"' 1 I the "carrying on" element of § 162 often represents a confus-
ing and complex element in the context of educational expenses and
a focal point of controversy between taxpayers and the IRS. Accord-
ingly, two issues relating to the "carrying on" requirement ultimately
contribute to the uncertainty of the Education Regulation: (1) when
has a taxpayer engaged in "carrying on" a trade or business, and (2)
tion"; and (4) "[T] ransparent; people are aware of its existence and know the burden
that it imposes; one objection to deficit financing is that it imposes disguised or
stealth taxation; this should be avoided in using tax financing." JOINT ECONOMIC
COMM., 105TH CONG., SOME UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES OF TAx POLICY 4 (Comm. Print
1998) (prepared by Richard K. Vedder & Lowell E. Gallaway).
107 I.R.C. § 162(a) (2000).
108 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(3) (as amended in 1967).
109 I.R.C. § 162(a); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b) (9) (as amended in 1972) ("Ex-
penditures made by a taxpayer in obtaining an education or in furthering his educa-
tion are not deductible unless they qualify under section 162 and § 1.162-5.").
110 Comm'r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 35 (1987).
111 See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-17(a) (as amended in 1990). A taxpayer can also carry
on a "trade or business" as a self-employed person, either in a sole proprietorship,
partnership, or similar unincorporated business organization.
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does a taxpayer, previously engaged in carrying on a trade or business,
continue to carry on a trade or business during the period that the
taxpayer attends school rather than actively participating in the
business? 112
The first issue-whether a taxpayer has engaged in carrying on a
trade or business-often arises for students who have recently ob-
tained a bachelor's degree or a law degree and secure summer em-
ployment before pursuing an advanced degree. This becomes
important because taxpayers cannot technically deduct educational
expenses unless they engage in "carrying on" a trade or business. In
other words, taxpayers cannot deduct expenses incurred prior to start-
ing a business or employment. 113 Regretfully, the Code and regula-
tion are silent on the level of activity required to engage in "carrying
on" a trade or business. The Tax Court, moreover, has explicitly de-
clined "to set a minimum period of time that one must be em-
ployed" 114 to begin carrying on a trade or business; the other
scattered cases addressing the issue also provide little help in formu-
lating consistent guidelines.
Although far from clear, a body of case law seems to mark the
ends of the spectrum. At one end, a taxpayer who secures summer
employment before graduating probably has not commenced carrying
on a trade or business. In Wassenaar v. Commissioner,1 5 the taxpayer
worked as a law clerk prior to graduating from law school. After grad-
uation, Wassenaar spent the summer studying for the bar exam and
attended New York University in the fall to obtain an LL.M. in taxa-
tion.116 The court denied the taxpayer's deduction for the expenses
incurred while attending NYU, concluding that the work he per-
formed before graduating from law school "in no way constituted his
being engaged in the practice of law."' 17 At the other end of the spec-
trum, courts seem to find a two-year period of employment sufficient
112 See CARLA NEELEY FREITAG & LISA MARIE STARCZEWSKI, SCHOLARSHIPS AND EDU-
CATIONAL EXPENSES, at A-30 (BNA Tax Management Portfolio 517, 1998); see also
Schoenfeld, supra note 55, at 241.
113 See Frank v. Comm'r, 20 T.C. 511, 513 (1953) (denying a deduction under
§ 162 for travel and legal expenses spent searching for potential business ventures
because the taxpayer was not engaged in a trade or business at the time the taxpayer
incurred the expenses); see also I.R.C. § 195 (Lexis 2005) (disallowing a current de-
duction for "start-up expenditures," but allowing an amortization deduction over a
sixty-month period at the taxpayer's election).
114 Link v. Comm'r, 90 T.C. 460, 464 (1988), affd without published opinion, 869
F.2d 1491 (6th Cir. 1989).
115 72 T.C. 1195 (1979).
116 Id. at 1197.
117 Id. at 1199.
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to establish that a taxpayer has engaged in carrying on a trade or busi-
ness. In Sherman v. Commissioner, 118 the Tax Court held that a tax-
payer who worked as a manager for two years with the Army and Air
Force Exchange Service before pursuing an M.B.A. degree at Harvard
had sufficiently established himself as an employee who was a business
manager.11 9
In between the extremes marked by Wassenaar and Sherman, the
tax cases provide limited help in developing general guidelines for the
"carrying on" requirement in the context of educational expenses. In
Ruehmann v. Commissioner,120 the taxpayer received an LL.B. from the
University of Georgia Law School in June 1967 and worked as a law
clerk for a firm the summer before graduation. 121 Ruehmann passed
the state bar exam and was admitted to practice law in Georgia after
his second year of law school as permitted under state law. 122 During
the summer following graduation, Ruehmann worked as an attorney
for the same firm.' 23 In September 1967, Ruehmann attended
Harvard Law School and received a graduate law degree in June
1968.124 The law firm offered Ruehmann a permanent position, as
the firm customarily did even when students planned to spend one
year pursuing ajudicial clerkship or an advanced legal degree. 125 The
Tax Court disallowed a deduction for the cost of completing the last
two quarters of his LL.B. degree at least in part because as a clerk he
was not carrying on a trade or business as a lawyer. The court, how-
ever, expressly held that Ruehmann could deduct the cost of pursuing
the graduate law degree from Harvard because he engaged in carry-
ing on a trade or business as a lawyer during the three summer
months following graduation.1 26
In Link v. Commissioner,127 however, the Tax Court reached the
opposite conclusion. Link graduated in May 1981 with a bachelor's
degree in operations research and worked as a market research ana-
lyst for Xerox Corporation from June 1981 to September 1981 before
pursuing, full-time, an M.B.A. degree at the University of Chicago.128
118 1977 T.C.M. (P-H) 77,301.
119 Id. at 1190.
120 1971 T.C.M. (P-H) 71,157.
121 Id. at 710.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 708.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 710-11.
127 90 T.C. 460 (1988), affd without published opinion, 869 F.2d 1491 (6th Cir.
1989).
128 Id. at 461-62.
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The court held Link never engaged in carrying on a trade or business
and his three month employment after graduation was "merely a tem-
porary hiatus in a continuing series of academic endeavors... [and] a
sporadic and isolated deviation from his 'career' as a student."129 The
Link court expressly refused, however, to establish a minimum period
of time that a taxpayer must be employed to carry on a trade or
business. 130
Cases such as Link and Ruehmann provide little guidance for de-
termining whether a taxpayer engaged in carrying on a trade or busi-
ness. Link and Ruehmann cannot be distinguished on the grounds
that Ruehmann was admitted to practice law during the three-month
period before pursuing his graduate law degree because the tax cases
clearly establish that bar admission or membership in good standing
in the profession are not tantamount to carrying on the profession for
purposes of § 162(a). 131 Moreover, the fact that Ruehmann worked
for the same firm during the summers before and after his graduation
from law school and prior to pursuing his graduate law degree cannot
distinguish the cases because the Ruehmann court expressly rejected
the argument that he engaged in carrying on a trade or business dur-
ing the three summer months prior to graduation.132 Rather than
distinguish the instant case from Ruehmann, the Link court disre-
garded the case, concluding that it was based upon specific factual
findings and not dispositive of the issues before the court as either
legal or factual precedent. 33 Subsequent courts have also declined to
distinguish Link and Ruehmann.'34
The second issue under § 162(a)'s "carrying on" requirement-
whether a taxpayer carries on an existing trade or business during the
time period when the taxpayer undertakes the education or train-
ing-is key because taxpayers cannot deduct educational expenses if
129 Id. at 464-65.
130 Id. at 464.
131 Johnson v. United States, 332 F. Supp. 906, 908 (1971) ("Professional status in
and of itself is not sufficient basis to conclude that taxpayer is 'carrying on a busi-
ness.'"); Weyts v. Comm'r, 2003 T.C.M. (RIA) 2003-068, at 334 (reaffirming that
"[a]dmission to the bar is not tantamount to being engaged in a trade or business of
practicing law"); Wassenaar v. Comm'r, 72 T.C. 1195, 1199-200 (1979) (recognizing
the "well-established principle that being a member in good standing of a profession
is not tantamount to carrying on that profession for the purpose of section 162(a)").
132 Ruehmann v. Comm'r, 1971 T.C.M. (P-H) 71,157, at 710 (concluding that
Ruehmann's "work while he was a law student at the University of Georgia was secon-
dary to his attendance at law school and did not place him in the trade or business of
being a lawyer").
133 Link, 90 T.C. at 464.
134 E.g., Weyts, 2003 T.C.M. (RIA) at 334.
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they ceased "carrying on" a trade or business. 135 This issue generally
arises when a taxpayer who had actively engaged in carrying on a
trade or business leaves for a period of time, either by taking a leave of
absence or severing employment, to pursue education and returns to
the same or different trade or business. In Revenue Ruling 68-591,136
the IRS announced the bright-line rule that it would consider a tax-
payer engaged in carrying on an existing trade or business although
the taxpayer "temporarily ceases" active involvement in the trade or
business to undertake education or training, provided that the suspen-
sion was for a period of a one year or less and the taxpayer resumed
the same employment or trade or business.137
The courts recognize a similar "hiatus principle" that provides a
taxpayer may carry on a trade or business within the meaning of
§ 162(a) during a "transition period" after leaving a trade or business
to seek different employment or undertake education. In Sherman v.
Commissioner'3 8 and subsequent cases,139 however, the Tax Court ex-
pressly refused to accept the IRS's one year rule as an absolute limita-
tion. Sherman left employment as a manager with the Army and Air
Force Exchange Services to attend Harvard University for two years to
obtain an M.B.A. degree. 140 Dismissing the IRS's bright-line rule as
merely an "opinion of one of the litigants in the case," the Tax Court
held Sherman's two-year suspension of active participation in "carry-
ing on" a trade or business was "temporary and definite."14' Further-
more, the court stated "[t]here is no magic in a one year limit on
'temporary' (other than possible ease of administration), and we be-
lieve a facts and circumstances test is the appropriate test for deter-
mining whether a hiatus is temporary rather than indefinite." 142 The
court also asserted "carrying on" a trade or business does not require a
135 This logically follows from § 162(a), which requires that a taxpayer engage in
"carrying on [a] trade or business." I.R.C. § 162(a) (2000).
136 1968-2 C.B. 73.
137 Id.
138 1977 T.C.M. (P-H) 77,301.
139 See Damm v. Comm'r, 1981 T.C.M. (P-H) 81,203, at 672 (determining a two-
year period of study was temporary); Picknally v. Comm'r, 1977 T.C.M. (P-H)
77,321, at 1292 (considering a three-year period of study "temporary"); see alsoJohn-
son v. Comm'r, 1988 T.C.M. (P-H) 88,177, at 932-33 (allowing a university profes-
sor to deduct educational expenses to attend a two-year doctoral program full-time
without questioning the "carrying on" requirement).
140 Sherman, 1977 T.C.M. (P-H) at 1190.
141 Id. at 1191-92.
142 Id.
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person to obtain a leave of absence to undertake education nor to
return to the same employer. 1
4 3
The Sherman court cautioned, however, that the "hiatus princi-
ple" is not without limits. According to the court, a taxpayer is not
"carrying on" a trade or business while attending school if the tax-
payer severs employment for a "prolonged period of study with no
apparent continuing connection with either his former job or any
clear indication of an intention to actively carry on the same trade or
business upon completion of study."1 4 4 To the extent that courts look
for a clear indication of intent to return to the same trade or business,
however, courts have further complicated the calculus by reintroduc-
ing the inquiry into the taxpayer's subjective intent that the current
regulation tried to eliminate.
Notwithstanding the court's decision in Sherman, the IRS ada-
mantly maintains that a temporary suspension must be for one year or
less. 145 In the end, the tension between the IRS and courts regarding
the hiatus principle only causes further confusion and uncertainty for
taxpayers already lost within the depths of the maze.
The Code, regulation, administrative interpretations, and judicial
decisions addressing the "carrying on" requirement leave many unan-
swered questions for taxpayers contemplating further education or
training. Unfortunately, only the most general guidelines can be
drawn from the cases and IRS pronouncements: taxpayers must work
long enough to engage in "carrying on" a trade or business, but taxpay-
ers must not study too long lest they cease "carrying on" the trade or
business. Beyond this, the definition of "long enough" and "too long"
are subject to uncertainty, confusion, and even disagreement between
the IRS and courts.
B. The Upward-Bound Disallowance Test
The upward-bound and minimum entry disallowance tests un-
questionably form the heart of the regulation and, not surprisingly,
have represented the most frequently litigated areas of the current
regulation. 146 The regulation asserts that the disallowance tests serve
the purpose of filtering out nondeductible expenses that are either
143 Id. at 1191.
144 Id.
145 Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-14-064 (Jan. 8, 1987) ("[T]he Sherman case, which the govern-
ment lost, does not reflect the position of the Service ...."); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 85-38-068
(June 26, 1985) ("Even though the government lost the Sherman case, [Revenue Rul-
ing 68-591] remain[s] the position of the Internal Revenue Service.").
146 Schoenfeld, supra note 55, at 277.
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"personal expenditures or constitute an inseparable aggregate of per-
sonal and capital expenditures." 147 As discussed above, a number of
legal commentators have criticized the regulation's treatment of in-
vestments in "human capital. ' 148 Instead of critiquing the theoretical
treatment of educational expenses, this section critiques the applica-
tion of the upward-bound disallowance test. More specifically, this
section wrestles with the difficult and confusing application of the up-
ward-bound test-arguably the regulation's most demanding yet elu-
sive standard-and the resulting uncertainty that leads to aggressive
tax positions and increased administrative costs.
1. The Underlying Standards for Applying the Upward-Bound Test
The current regulation's upward-bound disallowance test auto-
matically denies a deduction for any educational expenditure "which
is part of a program of study being pursued by him which will lead to
qualifying him in a new trade or business."149 As discussed previously, the
1967 amendments significantly altered the upward-bound test.150 As a
result of the shift from the subjective "primary purpose" to the objec-
tive "new trade or business" test, courts have focused on three key
factors when determining if an education leads to qualifying a tax-
payer for a new trade or business: (1) the "change of duties" rule, (2)
the "commonsense" test, and (3) the "objective" standard.151
Even though the upward-bound test relies significantly on the
concept of a "new trade or business," the regulation fails to define this
phrase except in the negative for one limited exception: "In the case
of an employee, a change of duties does not constitute a new trade or
business if the new duties involve the same general type of work as is
involved in the individual's present employment."1 52 The regulation,
however, does not clarify the application of the change of duties rule
except in the case of teachers, in which case the regulation considers
all teaching and related duties to involve the same general type of
work.153 As a result, the regulation left many unanswered questions
147 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(1) (as amended in 1967).
148 See sources cited supra note 102.
149 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(3)(i) (emphasis added).
150 See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
151 See FREITAG & STARCZEWSK1, supra note 112, at A-52 to A-53.
152 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(3). Although the change of duties rule only refers to
employees, Professors Bittker and Lokken suggest that same rule presumptively ap-
plies to self-employed persons as well. 1 BITTKER & LOrKEN, supra note 58, 1 22.1.3, at
22-12 n.42.
153 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(h)(3)(a)-(d).
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for applying the upward-bound test and necessarily passed the respon-
sibility of crafting a meaningful standard to the courts.
In response, courts developed the "commonsense" comparison
test to determine whether education or training leads to qualifying a
taxpayer for a new trade or business. Under this test, courts compare
the types of tasks and activities the taxpayer is qualified to perform
before undertaking education or training with the tasks and activities
the taxpayer is qualified to perform after achieving the particular title
or degree; if the tasks or activities are significantly different, the edu-
cation qualifies a taxpayer for a new trade or business.1 54 Courts gen-
erally look to the degree of supervision and responsibility involved in
the tasks and activities before and after pursuing the education. 155
Moreover, courts often rely on educational prerequisites under state
law regulating certain occupations and piofessions. 15 6 Under the
commonsense approach, the taxpayer does not have to complete the
education program or actually commence the different employment
or new trade or business for courts to conclude the education fails the
upward-bound test.157 Indeed, under the language of the regulation
and the courts' application of the commonsense standard, the educa-
tion itself does not have to qualify a taxpayer for a new trade or busi-
ness, but only "lead to qualifying" a taxpayer for this new position. I58
154 See Weiszmann v. Comm'r, 52 T.C. 1106, 1110 (1969), affdpercuriam, 443 F.2d
29 (9th Cir. 1971) (first articulating the comparison standard for the upward-bound
test under the 1967 Treasury Regulation); see also Glenn v. Comm'r, 62 T.C. 270, 275
(1974) (upholding the comparison standard as the "only commonsense approach to a
classification").
155 See, e.g., Weiszmann, 52 T.C. at 1110 (applying the commonsense approach by
comparing the difference between a lawyer and a patent trainee, specifically the vary-
ing tasks, relative responsibilities and supervision, comparative compensation, and
state requirements for admission to the bar).
156 See id.
157 See, e.g., Burt v. Comm'r, 1980 T.C.M. (P-H) 80,363 (denying a "Minister of
Music" a deduction for the cost of obtaining a bachelor of music degree even though
he continued with his work in church music and never intended to pursue the new
trade or business); O'Donnell v. Comm'r, 62 T.C. 781, 783 (1974), affd, 519 F.2d
1406 (7th Cir. 1975) (denying a deduction for a law degree because it qualified the
taxpayer for a new trade or business, and the fact that he "neither practiced nor in-
tended to practice law during the year at issue is irrelevant"); Weiszmann, 52 T.C. at
1111 (stating that the "regulations do not predicate disallowance of the deduction on
the actual practice of the new trade or business").
158 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(3); see also Browne v. Comm'r, 73 T.C. 723, 727
(1980); Diaz v. Comm'r, 70 T.C. 1067, 1075 (1978), aff'd, 607 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1979);
Glenn, 62 T.C. at 275-76. But see Blair v. Comm'r, 1980 T.C.M. (P-H) 1 80,488, at
2101 (rejecting the "one step along the way" argument because the court could not
.perceive an unfolding pattern of action by (the taxpayer] which would have qualified
her as a public accountant").
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Therefore, if the education combined with further work experience,
an examination, obtaining a license or permit, or completing further
educational requirements qualify a taxpayer for a new trade or busi-
ness, as determined by the commonsense test, the expenses are non-
deductible under the upward-bound test.159
Although the 1967 amendments clearly eliminated reliance on
the taxpayer's subjective primary purpose, 160 taxpayers continued to
justify a deduction for educational expenses on the basis that they
never intended to engage in a new trade or business, but undertook
the education solely to maintain or improve their current job skills.
Courts responded by emphasizing that an "objective standard" applies
under the current regulation's upward-bound test and the fact that
the taxpayer never actually undertook the new trade or business and
never intended to undertake the new trade or business was irrele-
vant.16 1 As the objective standard took form, courts used the standard
to exclude evidence that a taxpayer's employer required, encouraged,
or recommended the education 16 2 or evidence that pursuing such
new trade or business was economically infeasible for the taxpayer. 163
159 See, e.g., Cristea v. Comm'r, 1985 T.C.M. (P-H) 85,533 (denying an engineer-
ing aide a deduction for the expenses for engineering courses because it led to quali-
fying a taxpayer to practice as a professional engineer even though state law required
him to complete the education, obtain four years of work experience, and pass an
examination); Cooper v. Comm'r, 1979 T.C.M. (P-H) 79,241, at 915 (denying an
unlicensed accountant a deduction for the cost of accounting courses because the
education led to qualifying the taxpayer for a new trade or business as a certified
public accountant even though he failed the C.P.A. exam three times); O'Donnell, 62
T.C. at 784 (denying a taxpayer a deduction for pursuing a law degree because the
education represents "one step along the path" to qualifying him for the legal
profession).
160 See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
161 E.g., O'Donnell, 62 T.C. 781; Burt, 1980 T.C.M. (P-H) 80,363.
162 SeeTreas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b) (ii) ex. 2; seealsoMalekv. Comm'r, 1985 T.C.M. (P-
H) 85,428, at 1902 (concluding the taxpayer could not deduct expenses to obtain a
bachelor of arts degree that qualified her for a new trade or business even though her
employer required the degree as a condition of continued employment); Roussel v.
Comm'r, 1979 T.C.M. (P-H) 79,125 (denying a ground school safety instructor a
deduction for the cost of taking flying lessons even though the taxpayer's employer
threatened the taxpayer with dismissal for not teaching the class from a pilot's
perspective).
163 See Roussel 1979 T.C.M. (P-H) at 536 (denying an education deduction for
flying lessons because the lessons qualified the taxpayer for a career as a commercial
pilot even though the court recognized that embarking on this new career was eco-
nomically infeasible); see also Hinton v. Comm'r, 1982 T.C.M. (P-H) 82,539, at 2432
(denying a deduction for commercial pilot courses even though "in today's job mar-
ket it is highly unlikely that petitioner... could embark on a career as a commercial
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2. The Confusing Interplay of Standards
Not surprisingly, the interplay between the commonsense stan-
dard and the objective standard has not only plagued potential stu-
dents, but courts as well. For example, the taxpayer in Wiertzema v.
United States164 worked on the family farm, but enrolled in a sixteen
week welding course that would qualify him to work as a welder any-
where in the United States. 165 Upon completing the program, how-
ever, the taxpayer used the skills to repair machinery and equipment
and to construct farm implements used in the farming operations. 166
The court, struggling to apply the regulation, concluded "[t] here ap-
pears to be a split in the circuits" after observing that the Seventh
Circuit applied an "objective test," the Second Circuit used the "com-
monsense" approach, while the Tax Court has applied both ap-
proaches. 167  Following the commonsense approach, the court
allowed an educational deduction on summary judgment after con-
cluding the welding courses maintained or improved his skills. 16 8
Although the Wiertzema court correctly identified two different
standards under the upward-bound test, the court mistakenly con-
cluded that the objective standard and the commonsense test con-
flicted.1 69 Because the regulation fails to provide clear guidance and
courts sometimes further confuse the interplay by applying both stan-
dards but failing to expressly or accurately label them, observers can
understand the confusion. 170 The case law indicates, however, that
both the objective and commonsense standards apply under the up-
ward-bound test, but each standard addresses separate and distinct
issues. 1 7 1
The commonsense test specifically addresses the issue of whether
the education leads to qualifying the taxpayer for a new trade or busi-
pilot. The situations in which petitioner could earn a livelihood are limited, and be-
coming a commercial pilot may be a detrimental career move for him to make.").
164 747 F. Supp. 1363 (D.N.D. 1989).
165 Id. at 1364.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 1365.
169 See also FREITAG & STARCZEWSKI, supra note 112, at A-52 n.516.
170 Id. (noting that some cases do not expressly refer to the objective standard and
other cases do not mention the comparison test because the taxpayers probably did
not raise any subjective factors or the education clearly qualified the taxpayers for new
trades or businesses).
171 E.g., Vertick v. Comm'r, 628 F.2d 885, 886 (5th Cir. 1980); Brown v. Comm'r,
73 T.C. 723, 726-27 (1980); Weiszmann v. Comm'r, 52 T.C. 1106, 1110-11 (1969),
aff'd per curiam, 443 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1971).
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ness. Weiszmann v. Commissioner172 established the commonsense test.
In that case, a part-time patent trainee enrolled in law school and de-
ducted the educational expenses under § 162. The court denied the
deduction under the upward-bound test, concluding "[t]he trade or
business of attorney is sufficiently different from that of a patent trainee
to constitute a new trade or business." 173 In reaching this decision,
the court compared a lawyer and a patent trainee, noting the differ-
ence between the varying tasks, relative responsibilities and supervi-
sion, comparative compensation, and state requirements for
admission to the bar. 174 In Glenn v. Commissioner,175 the Tax Court
later expressly adopted the Weiszmann commonsense approach when
applying the upward-bound test. In that case, the court, recognizing
the limited case law suggesting a standard for applying the upward-
bound test, concluded:
What has been suggested, and we uphold such suggestion as the
only commonsense approach to a classification, is that a comparison
be made between the types of activities which the taxpayer was qual-
ified to perform before the acquisition of a particular title or de-
gree, and those which he is qualified to perform afterwards. Where
we have found such activities and abilities to be significantly differ-
ent, we have disallowed an educational expenses deduction based
on our finding that there had been qualification for a new trade or
business. 1 76
The objective standard, on the other hand, addresses the issue of
what evidence is relevant when applying the upward-bound test. In
particular, the objective standard primarily excludes evidence of the
following when applying the upward-bound test: the taxpayer's subjec-
tive intent or motive for undertaking the education; whether the tax-
payer's employer required, encouraged, or recommended the
education; or whether economic infeasibility precluded the taxpayer
from actually pursuing the new trade or business.1 77 In O'Donnell v.
Commissioner,178 a tax accountant argued he pursued a law degree to
improve his accounting and tax skills and never practiced or intended
to practice law. Denying the education deduction under the upward-
bound test, the court emphasized that the fact that O'Donnell neither
practiced nor intended to practice law was irrelevant, stating that this
172 52 T.C. 1106.
173 Id. at 1110 (emphasis added).
174 Id.
175 62 T.C. 270 (1974).
176 Id. at 275 (citation omitted).
177 See supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text.
178 62 T.C. 781 (1974), affd, 519 F.2d 1406 (7th Cir. 1975).
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fact may have been relevant under the 1958 regulation, but "[t]he
objective test incorporated in the existing regulations applies."1 79 Indi-
cating that the commonsense and objective standards are separate
and distinct, the O'Donnell court then applied the commonsense stan-
dard, concluding that as an attorney, O'Donnell "would be qualified
to perform tasks far greater and more than he could as an account-
ant.... These possibilities make it abundantly clear that... by attend-
ing law school, [he] has qualified himself for a new trade or
business."180 Ironically, the Wiertzema court cited O'Donnell for the
proposition that the circuits were split on the standard, yet O'Donnell
clearly applies, although not expressly by name, both the objective
and the commonsense standards.
181
3. The Difficult Application of the Upward-Bound Test
Applying the upward-bound test is arguably the most mind-numb-
ing undertaking required by the current regulation. As discussed
above, this test automatically disallows a deduction for educational ex-
penses if the education is part of a program of study that "leads to
qualifying" the taxpayer for a "new trade or business."18 2 Accordingly,
courts generally must wrestle with two main issues when applying the
upward-bound test: (1) does the education "lead to qualifying" a tax-
payer for existing 83 "trades or businesses" and (2) are these trades or
businesses "new" to the taxpayer? The following subsections focus on
the difficult and confusing application of the upward-bound test, in
particular, the seemingly speculative search for new trades or busi-
nesses and the narrow lines courts sometimes draw when applying the
179 Id. at 783 (emphasis added).
180 Id. (citing Weiszmann v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 1106, 1110 (1969)).
181 Wiertzema v. United States, 747 F. Supp. 1363, 1364 (D.N.D. 1989).
182 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(3) (as amended in 1967).
183 It is not sufficient to apply the commonsense standard in a vacuum. Instead,
the court should consider the taxpayer's newly acquired skills, abilities, degrees, or
titles in light of existing employment positions and trade or business opportunities.
In Gruman v. Commissioner, 1982 T.C.M. (P-H) 82,388, a co-pilot of a Boeing 707
aircraft for American Airlines took courses that certified him as an airline transport
pilot for the Cessna Citation aircraft. Id. at 1699. Prior to taking the courses, the co-
pilot could operate a Cessna Citation under the applicable FAA regulations, but not
for a common carrier. At that time no common carrier flew the Cessna Citation. Id.
The court held that although the airline transport pilot certificate appeared to have
considerably increased the co-pilot's abilities, as a practical matter the certificate did
not expand the scope of piloting activities available to him because the new trade or
business of piloting a Cessna Citation for a common carrier "simply did not exist." Id. at
1700 (emphasis added).
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commonsense approach to determine if the trades or businesses are
"new" to the taxpayer.
a. Searching for Existing "Trades or Businesses"
The upward-bound test serves the theoretical purpose of filtering
out education expenditures that represent nondeductible personal
expenses or capital expenditures. The 1967 amendments to the up-
ward-bound test adopted an objective standard to avoid the former
dilemma of determining whether taxpayers intended to stay in their
current trade or business or use the education to move on to a new
trade or business. The current regulation, however, has replaced the
old problem of determining intent with the new problem of an almost
unrestrained search for existing trades or businesses in an effort to
separate capital expenditures and personal expenses from business
expenses. To demonstrate by comparison the speculative nature of
this search, imagine that a police officer issued a ticket to Jane for
speeding or attempting to speed after she picked up a driver's manual
to study for the exam at the local branch office of the state depart-
ment of motor vehicles because this represented "one step" along the
path that leads to qualifying her to violate the traffic laws. The officer
had to assume, however, that Jane would undertake driver's training,
pass the examination and obtain her driver's license, and actually
drive a car in excess of the speed limit, but had to ignore any evidence
that she could not afford to pay for automobile insurance or to buy a
car or that she never intended to drive a car. One would likely con-
clude that this is ridiculous. As the following discussion reveals, the
search for new trades or businesses under the upward-bound test as
shaped by the courts essentially involves similar speculation often
hinging upon difficult assumptions and ignoring important factual
realities.
Courts have struggled with the "lead to qualifying" element of the
upward-bound test when determining the degree to which the educa-
tion itself must play a role in qualifying a taxpayer for a new trade or
business. Courts have taken several different approaches. O'Donnell v.
Commissioner, for example, adopted the "one step" approach that re-
quires the education to serve a minor role: the education needs only
to represent "one step along the path of entering the new trade or
business."' 84 Therefore, the one-step approach only requires the edu-
cation to be "helpful" in qualifying the taxpayer for the new trade or
184 O'DonnelI 62 T.C. at 784.
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business. 185 The court, however, required more in Blair v. Commis-
sioner.186 The Blair court expressly held that the education must not
just be "one step along the path," but the taxpayer must undertake an
"unfolding pattern of action" that would have qualified the taxpayer
for a new trade or business for the court to disallow the deduction.
187
By comparison, the court in Cristea v. Commissioner'88 seemed to take a
more intermediate approach, denying a deduction for the cost of ob-
taining a bachelor of science degree in engineering because it repre-
sented the " crucialfirst step in his travel along a path culminating in his
qualifying for the new trade or business."' 89
Of these three approaches, most courts follow the more rigid
O'Donnell one-step approach. While qualification in the new trade or
business may require significant additional steps, such as completing
the education, pursuing further education, passing an examination,
securing licenses or permits, or obtaining more experience, under the
upward-bound test the taxpayer does not actually have to complete
any of these prerequisites.190 Instead, courts assume the taxpayer can
and will complete all additional prerequisites to enter the new trade
or business. Moreover, building on the one-step test, courts do not
require the education to be a "necessary" step to enter the new trade
or business. Instead, education that is an "alternative step" is suffi-
cient to deny the deduction.l91 For example, if the taxpayer could
satisfy a prerequisite for a new trade or business by either further edu-
cation or additional work experience and the taxpayer chose to pur-
185 See, e.g., Sharon v. Comm'r, 66 T.C. 515, 530 (1976) (concluding that bar re-
view courses "helped" qualify a lawyer engaged in the practice of law in New York to
engage in the new trade or business of practicing law in California); Archie v.
Comm'r, 1978 T.C.M. (P-H) 78,425, at 1753 ("Thus, the obtaining of a certificate as
a CPA clearly is 'one step along the path' of entering the trade or business of public
accounting.").
186 1980 T.C.M. (P-H) 1 80,488, at 2099.
187 Id. at 2101.
188 1985 T.C.M. (P-H) 85,533, at 2397.
189 Id. at 2400.
190 See cases cited supra note 159.
191 See, e.g., Reisinger v. Comm'r, 71 T.C. 568, 570 (1979) (stating a physician's
assistant under state law can qualify on the basis of "training, skill, experience or back-
ground," but taxpayers who choose to qualify through education and examination
cannot deduct the educational expenses); Cristea, 1985 T.C.M. (P-H) at 2400 (holding
an engineering degree qualified the taxpayer for a new trade or business and
"[n]either does the fact that petitioner could have chosen an alternative route to
qualify for his new profession, one that does not require education but requires 12 or
20 years of work experience . . . justify the deductibility of the educational expense
that he chose to incur").
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sue the education, courts may treat the education as "one step"
leading to qualifying the taxpayer for this new position.
Factual realities and sensibility do not seem to restrain the search
for trades or businesses by the courts or the IRS, either. Indeed, in
the name of objectivity, courts disallow a deduction for educational
expenses that represent "one step" along the path to a new trade or
business even though the taxpayer never intends to enter the trade or
business, 192 the taxpayer's employer requires or encourages the edu-
cation,193 the taxpayer's duties are not significantly different after the
education from what they had been before the education, 194 or even if
pursuing the new trade or business would be economically prohibitive
for the taxpayer.195
While the regulation attempted to eliminate reliance on the tax-
payer's subjective intent and most courts exclude all evidence of the
taxpayer's intent, some courts, either intentionally or not, have al-
lowed the taxpayer's subjective intent to slip back into the equation
when searching for trades or businesses. For example, in Cooper v.
Commissioner,196 the taxpayer, an unlicensed accountant working for
his father's accounting firm, enrolled in a program leading to a
master's degree in accounting for the purpose of completing the ac-
counting courses necessary to take the C.P.A exam. The taxpayer
took two mathematics courses, one economics course, one finance
course, and one accounting course. 197 The Tax Court denied a de-
duction for the cost of taking the accounting course, but allowed a
deduction for all the other courses. 198 The court reasoned only the
accounting courses led to qualifying the taxpayer for a new trade or
business because the taxpayer "needed only additional courses in ac-
counting to meet the prerequisites to sit for the C.P.A. examina-
tion." 199 At the time of trial, the taxpayer worked as an unlicensed
192 See cases cited supra note 161.
193 See sources cited supra note 162.
194 See, e.g., Vertrick v. Comm'r, 628 F.2d 885, 887 (5th Cir. 1980) (denying a
deduction for the cost of attending law school by a taxpayer who was admitted to and
regularly practiced in federal courts prior to attending law school); Grover v.
Comm'r, 68 T.C. 598, 602 (1977) (denying a deduction for the cost of law school, but
acknowledging that prior to graduation from law school he "performed many of the
same tasks and activities often performed by lawyers, or their military equivalent,judge advocates"); Sharon v. Comm'r, 66 T.C. 515 (1976) (denying a New York lawyer
a deduction for a bar review course to prepare for the California bar exam).
195 See cases cited supra note 163.
196 1979 T.C.M. (P-H) 1 79,241, at 913.
197 Id. at 914.
198 Id. at 915.
199 Id.
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accountant and had taken, and failed, the C.P.A. exam three times.200
The taxpayer's obvious and admitted purpose for undertaking the ed-
ucation was to complete the necessary accounting courses to take the
C.P.A. exam and become a certified public accountant.201 It is equally
fair to say, however, that the taxpayer did not intend to become a
mathematician, school teacher, stockbroker, or financial analyst.
Nonetheless, the mathematics, economics, and finance courses un-
questionably represent "one step" along a path that might lead to
qualifying the taxpayer for these careers. Consequently, by disallow-
ing a deduction for the accounting course and allowing a deduction
for the other courses, the court let the taxpayer's apparent subjective
intent influence the application of the upward-bound test by focusing
only on the trade or business the taxpayer intended to pursue.
In an effort to identify capital expenditures and nondeductible
personal expenses, the upward-bound test requires a search for new
trades or businesses. When performing this seemingly speculative
search to identify some new trade or business, courts generally require
the education to serve only a minor role as one "helpful" step, make
unlikely assumptions, and ignore important factual evidence, such as
economic practicability, employer requirements, and the taxpayer's
intent. As a result, this speculative search is a confusing and problem-
atic approach for determining tax incentives for higher education.
b. Identifying "New" Trades or Businesses
After identifying any trades or businesses that the education leads
to qualifying the taxpayer to perform, courts must then determine if
the trades or businesses are "new" to the taxpayer. To do so, courts
apply the commonsense approach and compare the tasks and activi-
ties the taxpayer was qualified to perform before and after the educa-
tion. In some cases, the education obviously qualifies a taxpayer to
perform substantially different tasks and activities.202 In other cases,
however, courts have concluded the education qualifies a taxpayer for
a new trade or business when the tasks and activities have remained
200 Id. at 914.
201 Id.
202 Bachelor's degrees and law degrees are the two primary examples of degrees
that, according to the courts, obviously qualify a taxpayer for new trades or businesses.
See, e.g., Warren v. Comm'r, 2003 T.C.M. (RIA) 2003-175, at 932 ("It may be all but
impossible for a taxpayer to establish that a bachelor's degree program does not qual-
ify the taxpayer in a new trade or business."); Galligan v. Comm'r, 2002 T.C.M. (RIA)
2002-150, at 967 (disallowing a deduction for the cost of obtaining a law degree
because a law degree qualified the taxpayer for a new trade or business).
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substantially the same. Sharon v. Commissioner203 provides the quintes-
sential example of this result.
In Sharon, an attorney licensed to practice law in New York took a
California bar review course to prepare for the California bar exam. A
sharply divided Tax Court held, notwithstanding the fact that Sharon
was licensed to practice law in New York, that the courses led to quali-
fying him for a new trade or business and, therefore, denied the de-
duction under § 162 for the cost of the review course.204 According to
the court, Sharon could perform substantially different tasks and activ-
ities in California after undertaking the bar review course and subse-
quently receiving a license to practice law in California; thus, under
the commonsense approach the education qualified him for a new
trade or business.
The court's conclusion that the tasks and activities of a New York
lawyer differ significantly from those performed by a California lawyer
contradicts common sense. Surely, as an attorney practicing in Cali-
fornia, Sharon would perform the same general type of tasks and ac-
tivities that he previously performed practicing law in New York.
Indeed, Judge Irwin, one of the four dissenting judges in Sharon, took
this view. Judge Irwin sharply criticized the court for departing from
the commonsense approach and argued that the bar review course
did not qualify Sharon for a new trade or business because he "could
perform the same types of tasks and activities in that state as he was
already qualified to perform in New York."20 5
Consider for a moment the far-reaching consequences of this
holding for professions requiring a state license. As one example, all
states impose minimum educational requirements for individuals
seeking to become certified public accountants. Some states, such as
New Hampshire, only require a bachelor's degree with a certain num-
ber of accounting and business credits; 20 6 other states, such as New
York, require a bachelor's degree plus a total of 150 credit hours,
which generally requires thirty credit hours more than most bache-
lor's degree requirements. 207 Under Sharon, a certified public ac-
countant who has met New Hampshire's requirements is forever
barred from deducting the cost of additional education for college
credit because it would "lead to qualifying" the taxpayer for a "new
trade or business" as a certified public accountant in New York. Recall
203 66 T.C. 515 (1976).
204 Id. at 529-30.
205 Id. at 537 (Irwin, J., dissenting).
206 N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. ANN. Ac 302.02 (1996).
207 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGs. tit. 8, § 70.1 (2001).
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that the accountant's intent for actually undertaking the education is
irrelevant.
This Part began by describing the confusion in determining what
standards-the commonsense approach, the objective standard, the
change of duties rule-are used in applying the regulation's upward-
bound test. Next, this Part analyzed the primary difficulties in actually
applying these standards, specifically the speculative nature of the test
and the seemingly narrow definition some courts give to new trades or
businesses when the tasks and activities seem to be substantially the
same. The aura of confusion and uncertainty surrounding this aspect
of the Education Regulation monster indicates that the upward-bound
test is ill-equipped to appropriately determine the deductibility of ed-
ucational expenses. Instead, one unified tax credit would provide sim-
plicity and certainty for taxpayers pursuing higher education.
C. Playing the "Audit Lottery"
The uncertainty and complexity flowing from the application of
the regulation's vague tests and the intensive fact-based inquiry in-
crease the likelihood taxpayers may incorrectly claim a deduction for
educational expenses. Four general possibilities exist under the regu-
lation: (1) the regulation in fact allows a deduction for the education
and the taxpayer claims the deduction; (2) the regulation in fact disal-
lows a deduction for the education and the taxpayer does not claim
the deduction; (3) the regulation in fact disallows a deduction for the
education, but the taxpayer claims the deduction; and (4) the regula-
tion in fact allows a deduction for the education, but the taxpayer
does not claim the deduction. With the first two possibilities, the tax-
payer properly treats the educational expenses under the regulation.
With the last two possibilities, the taxpayer incorrectly treats the edu-
cational expenses under the regulation.
20 8
The uncertainty caused both by the required fact-based inquiry
and the regulation's confusing and difficult tests increases the likeli-
hood that taxpayers incorrectly treat the educational expenses-ei-
ther failing to claim a deduction the regulation permits or, more
importantly, claiming a deduction the regulation disallows. Although
taxpayers may in good faith deduct the educational expenses accord-
208 When a taxpayer qualifies for a deduction under the Education Regulation
and the tax benefit from this deduction exceeds the potential benefit from § 25A or
§ 222, the taxpayer pays more taxes than required by the Code by not claiming the
deduction. If a taxpayer does not qualify for the deduction, but nevertheless claims
the deduction, the taxpayer pays less tax than required unless § 25A or § 222 would
provide a greater potential benefit.
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ing to the regulation and the tangled body of case law, the IRS and
courts might disallow the deduction because the determination of de-
ductibility depends on the facts of the particular case. The uncertain
and confusing application of the tests not only increases administra-
tive costs, but may deter some taxpayers from claiming a deduction
they are entitled to under the regulation.
Even more troubling, the often confusing and uncertain applica-
tion of these tests increases the chance that taxpayers will play the
"audit lottery" and claim the education deduction even in questiona-
ble cases if it provides a greater tax benefit. The "audit lottery" gener-
ally refers to the likelihood that the IRS will examine the taxpayer's
tax return; on average this risk is less than one percent for individual
taxpayers. 20 9 Essentially, taxpayers who consider playing the "audit
lottery" generally perform a rough cost benefit analysis. The risk of
audit and the potential additional tax, penalties, and interest for im-
properly claiming the education deduction all impact the expected
cost. In particular, the accuracy-related penalty in § 6662 serves as the
IRS's main weapon against taxpayers who play the lottery and under-
pay their tax liability by taking aggressive tax positions that fall short of
fraud. 210 This penalty can be reduced or eliminated, however, if the
taxpayer (1) relied on "substantial authority" for the deduction or (2)
disclosed the relevant facts and had a "reasonable basis" for such treat-
ment.211 Taxpayers considering deducting educational expenses may
survey the sometimes confusing and inconsistent case law and con-
clude that they can avoid at least the accuracy related penalty. Moreo-
ver, taxpayers evaluating the expected cost might think that the IRS
would prefer to settle rather than litigate a deduction for educational
expenses based on the seemingly confusing clutter of case law.
209 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
DATA BOOK 2004, at 18 tbl.10, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/
04databk.pdf (reporting that the IRS examined only 1,007,874 of the 130,134,277
individual income tax returns filed in 2003 amounting to 0.77% audit rate).
210 GUNN & WARD, supra note 3, at 21; see also I.R.C. § 6662 (Lexis 2005) (impos-
ing a penalty for an understatement of tax attributable to, among other things, negli-
gence or disregard for the tax rules or substantial understatement of income tax).
The Code imposes various other penalties as well, including a penalty for an un-
derpayment of tax due to fraud under § 6663 and a penalty on tax-return preparers
under § 6694 for understatements due to tax positions that lack a "realistic posibility
of being sustained on [the] merits." I.R.C. §§ 6663, 6694 (2000). Courts have not
shied away from upholding these penalties when the taxpayer aggressivly claimed a
tax deduction under the regulation. E.g., Kersey v. Comm'r, 1993 T.C.M. (RIA) 1
93,641, at 3397, aff'd, 50 F.3d 15 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding a penalty under § 6662
for improperly claiming a deduction for a bachelor of arts degree).
211 I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B).
2022 [VOL. 8o:5
2005] SLAYING THE MONSTER IN THE EDUCATION TAX MAZE
For certain taxpayers, however, the rewards for claiming the de-
duction are quite high. In particular, taxpayers who cannot claim the
Hope or Lifetime Learning Credits or the deduction for qualified tui-
tion and related expenses under § 222 because their income exceeds
the phase-out amounts established in the respective provisions have a
significant incentive to claim a deduction under § 162.212 Ironically,
taxpayers who cannot take full advantage of the nonrefundable credit
because they have little income or tax liability may also have an incen-
tive to claim the deduction to generate a net operating loss for busi-
ness expenses that may offset income in past or future years.213
Moreover, taxpayers who incur educational expenses greater than the
$10,000 amount eligible for the Lifetime Learning Credit 214 or who
undertake education that fails to meet the requirements for the Hope
and Lifetime Learning Credits or the deduction under § 222 also have
an incentive to claim a deduction under § 162.215 Accordingly, such
taxpayers have a particular incentive to play the "audit lottery" be-
cause the potential tax benefits exceed the perceived costs should the
IRS audit their tax return.
One commentator described how an accountant speaking at a
prestigious business school told M.B.A. students that they should de-
duct their tuition expenses under the regulation even in cases at the
margins because the "law was uncertain and manipulable, the chances
of getting audited slim, and the penalty for doing so low." 21 6 In fact,
the accountant expressed that students had a ninety-seven to ninety-
eight percent chance of not getting audited, allowing them to "'save
$15,000 on [their] taxes!"' 21 7 As another example, a tax accountant,
targeting prospective M.B.A. and graduate students who potentially
qualify for a deduction under the regulation, boldly states on his web-
site that the benefit of deducting educational expenses under the reg-
ulation is "saving a lot of money," while the "worst case scenario is that
your deduction is disallowed and you simply repay your taxes plus in-
terest .... This means that your only 'loss' is the repayment of the
interest expense."218 Moreover, the accountant notes he "provides all
212 See supra notes 27, 44 and accompanying text.
213 See I.R.C. § 172 (Lexis 2005); Treas. Reg. § 1.172-3(a)(3)(i) (as amended in
1986).
214 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
215 See supra Part I.A.
216 K. Sandra Favelukes, Tax Economics 101-The Need for Enforcement, 103 TAX
NOTES 353, 353 (2004), available at LEXIS, 2004 TNT 76-28.
217 Id. at 355.
218 Tax Man, Inc., MBA & MPA Students, at http://www.taxman.com/stu-
dents.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2005) (emphasis omitted).
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clients with FREE expert audit assistance, in the unlikely event of an
audit" and proudly boasts that the IRS only audited forty-four of his
many M.B.A. and graduate clients, resulting in forty-two wins and two
compromises during appeal.219 As a final incentive, the website allows
students to calculate the potential tax savings by deducting their edu-
cational expenses.220
In response to this concern, one commentator encourages the
IRS to initiate "[m]ore audits and more law suits to clarify the gray
areas within the law and overturn any bad precedent" and to "impose
penalties more aggressively on individuals who engage in questionable
tax strategies." 221 While this response may deter some taxpayers from
aggressively deducting the educational expenses, it fails to adequately
and timely remedy the weaknesses of the regulation: its vague tests,
the confusing and seemingly speculative standards adopted by courts
for applying these tests, and the inherent uncertainty flowing from the
regulation's required fact-based inquiry. Moreover, this response
would impose additional administrative costs. Instead, this Note en-
courages Congress and the IRS to focus directly on the Education
Regulation monster that has long plagued taxpayers and courts. Spe-
cifically, Congress can provide simplicity and certainty and surely re-
duce administrative costs by slaying the monster and dismantling the
education tax maze.
MODIFIED PROPOSAL AND CONCLUSION
With the existing tax incentives for current higher education ex-
penses, taxpayers must enter a complex tax maze and may confront
the Education Regulation monster. In the process, a taxpayer will
likely analyze no less than four separate provisions: the Hope Credit,
the Lifetime Learning Credit, the above-the-line deduction for quali-
fied tuition and related expenses, and Treasury Regulation § 1.162-5.
To "promote simplicity in delivering education tax benefits," 222 the
staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation proposed combining the
Hope and Lifetime Learning Credits and the above-the-line deduction
for qualified tuition and related expenses into a single nonrefundable
credit.223 The staff also proposed that the unified education credit
219 Id. (emphasis omitted).
220 Tax Man, Inc., Tax Savings Calculator, at http://www.taxman.com/
taxcalculator.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2005).
221 Favelukes, supra note 216, at 353.
222 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 17, at 42.
223 Id. Because a nonrefundable tax credit only offsets tax liability and because
lower income taxpayers generally do not have sufficient tax liability to fully utilize the
Hope or Lifetime Learning Credits, many commentators have suggested making the
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provide benefits on a per student basis, similar to the current Hope
Credit, and equal to twenty-five percent of the first $10,000 dollars of
qualified educational expenses for both graduate and undergraduate
studies regardless of enrollment status (i.e., half time or otherwise) .224
In addition, the phase-outs for the proposed credit would begin when
adjusted gross income exceeds $70,000 ($140,000 if married filing a
joint return).225
This Note supports this proposal, but to provide true simplifica-
tion of the tax incentives for current higher education expenses, this
Note recommends Congress bravely confront and slay the Education
Regulation, a monster that has long plagued taxpayers and courts.
Congress can effectively slay the monster by enacting a statutory provi-
sion that simply denies a deduction under § 162 for education and
related expenditures paid or incurred for enrollment at an eligible
educational institution 22 6 in a program leading toward a postsecon-
dary degree, certificate, or other recognized postsecondary educa-
tional credential.227 If the educational expenditure passes this
threshold bright-line test, the taxpayer may deduct the expenditure
under § 162 if the taxpayer meets § 162's other general require-
education credit refundable. For example, Dr. Susan Dynarski, Assistant Professor of
Public Policy at Harvard University, encourages Congress to make the education
credit refundable because the current incentives "offer the most help to a very atypi-
cal student, the one who attends an elite private university." The Role of Higher Educa-
tion Financing in Strengthening U.S. Competitiveness in a Global Economy: Hearing Before the
Senate Comm. on Fin., 108th Cong. 5 (2004) (statement of Dr. Susan Dynarski, Assistant
Professor of Pub. Policy, John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov't, Harvard Univ.). Dr. Dynarski
recommends a refundable credit to make education more affordable to lower income
taxpayers and, in turn, better encourage lower income taxpayers to pursue higher
education. Id. The staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, however, counters that
federal programs provide direct grants for lower income students and that "refund-
able credits are administratively complex and potentially more subject to fraudulent
claims that are difficult to recoup." STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra
note 17, at 43.
224 STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 17, at 43.
225 Id. Compare the proposed phase-out limits to the § 25A phase-outs, supra note
27 and accompanying text, and the § 222 deduction phase-outs, supra note 44 and
accompanying text.
226 For purposes of this provision, the definition of "eligible educational institu-
tion" would generally mean an accredited college, university, vocational school, or
other postsecondary educational institution that participates in or is eligible to partici-
pate in the federal financial aid program. This definition mirrors the definition used
by the Hope and Lifetime Learning Credits. See Treas. Reg. § 1.25A-2(b) (2002).
227 This statutory provision adopts the Hope Credit's "degree requirement" and
essentially provides a bright-line rule by channeling all degree-seeking taxpayers into
the new unified education tax credit. SeeTreas. Reg. § 1.25A-3(d) (1) (i) (as amended
in 2003).
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ments. 228 Accordingly, this limit on a deduction under § 162 and the
proposed unified education credit would provide broader simplifica-
tion of educational tax incentives.
This limitation on § 162 and the proposed unified education
credit compliment each other. Most importantly, the above statutory
limit to § 162 would eliminate the most troubling aspect of the cur-
rent regulation by shifting all educational expenses paid or incurred
by a taxpayer who enrolls at an eligible education institution in a de-
gree program out of § 162 and into the unified education credit. For
example, the typical student who enrolls in a degree program at an
eligible educational institution would only qualify for the proposed
unified education credit, and not a deduction under § 162. A student
who enrolls in a degree program at an ineligible educational institu-
tion (e.g., certain unaccredited colleges) could not claim the credit
but may claim a potential deduction under § 162. On the other hand,
the typical professional or employee who undertakes work-related
continuing professional education at somewhere other than an eligi-
ble educational institution would only potentially qualify for a deduc-
tion under § 162. If a taxpayer pursues courses or seminars at an
eligible educational institution but does not enroll in a degree pro-
gram, the taxpayer could potentially claim the deduction or the pro-
posed unified education credit.229
228 Such educational expenditures must meet the general requirements of § 162
for business expenses. Specifically, the taxpayer must engage in carrying on a trade
or business, the expenses must be ordinary and necessary, and the expenses must
have some direct relationship to the taxpayer's trade or business. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.162-1 (a) (as amended in 1958). The author recognizes that taxpayers who poten-
tially qualify for a deduction under § 162 must continue to wrestle with the vague
"carrying on" requirement discussed in Part II.A, but the proposed limitation would
generally eliminate the most troubling cases where degree-seeking taxpayers under-
take education full-time at an eligible educational institution.
229 The proposed unified education credit presumably adopts the Lifetime Learn-
ing Credit's more liberal definition of "qualified tuition and related expenses" to in-
clude "amounts paid for a course at an eligible educational institution ... if the
course is either part of a postsecondary degree program or is not part of a postsecon-
dary degree program but taken by the student to acquire or improve job skills."
Treas. Reg. § 1.25A-4(c) (2002); see also supra note 224 and accompanying text. If
Congress wants to simplify educational tax incentives further, it should limit the uni-
fied education credit to degree-seeking candidates at eligible educational institutions,
as required by the current Hope Credit. See Treas. Reg. § 1.25A-3(d) (1) (as amended
in 2003). First, this would simplify educational tax incentives even further by com-
pletely integrating § 162 and the credit-if the educational expenses potentially qual-
ify for the credit, the expenses could not qualify for a deduction under § 162; if the
educational expenses potentially qualify for a deduction under § 162, the expenses
could not qualify for the credit. Moreover, the Lifetime Learning Credit requires a
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This proposed limitation on § 162 would continue to provide em-
ployees a current tax benefit for employer-provided educational assis-
tance found in § 127.230 In particular, if an employer provides
educational assistance pursuant to a program described in § 127, the
employer may deduct the cost of providing such assistance and the
employee may exclude from gross income an amount up to $5250. If
an employer provides educational assistance in excess of $5250, the
next issue is whether the employee could deduct the educational ex-
penses under § 162's limiting provision as described above. If the em-
ployee could deduct the educational expenses, the excess amount is
generally considered a working condition fringe benefit and excluded
from the employee's gross income.231 If the employee could not de-
duct the educational expenses, the excess amount is included in the
employee's gross income, but the employee may qualify to claim the
unified education credit on his or her individual tax return.
Slaying the Education Regulation monster by limiting an educa-
tion deduction under § 162 and dismantling the maze by combining
business nexus for non-degree-seeking students, more properly the realm of § 162
work-related expenses.
230 If an employer provides educational assistance, the employee-student must also
consider § 127. This section allows an employee to exclude from gross income up to
$5250 for employer-provided educational assistance furnished pursuant to a qualified
program. I.R.C. § 127(a) (2000). For an educational assistance program to satisfy the
Code's requirements, an employer must (1) prepare a separate written plan exclu-
sively for the benefit of employees, (2) not discriminate in favor of highly compen-
sated employees, (3) not pay or incur for the year more than five percent of the
amounts paid for educational assistance to benefit the class of individuals consisting
of shareholders or owners (or their spouses or dependents) who own more than five
percent interest in the employer, (4) not provide employees with a choice between
educational assistance and other payments includible in gross income, and (5) pro-
vide reasonable notice to eligible employees. Id. § 127(b)(1)-(6). Section 127, of
course, provides detailed definitions, attribution rules, and related provisions that are
beyond the scope of this Note. See id. § 127(c)(2)-(5).
For purposes of the § 127 exclusion, the Code defines educational assistance to
mean (1) payment by an employer for educational expense, including undergraduate
and graduate tuition, fees, books, supplies, and equipment and (2) courses provided
by an employer and related books, supplies, and equipment. Educational assistance
specifically excludes payments for tools or supplies the employee may retain, meals,
lodging, or transportation, or payment for education involving sports, games, or hob-
bies. Id. § 127(c) (1) (Supp. I 2001).
Section 127 specifies how its provisions relate to other Code sections. In particu-
lar, § 127(c) (7) denies a deduction or credit for any amount excluded from income.
Of some significance, § 127 specifically provides that it shall not be construed to affect
the tax treatment of educational expenses under §§ 117, 162, or 212. Id. § 127(c) (6)
(2000).
231 Id. § 132(a), (d) (Lexis 2005).
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§ 25A and § 222 achieves several principal policy objectives. First, and
most importantly, this proposal provides simplicity and certainty for
taxpayers pursuing higher education by providing one unified educa-
tion credit and avoiding the troubling application of the regulation to
the common degree-seeking taxpayer.23 2 Second, and as a result of
the first objective, this proposal would help minimize the "audit lot-
tery" incentive and likely reduce administrative costs and the tax gap.
Finally, it would achieve a more equitable benefit by making the credit
apply on a per student basis rather than per taxpayer,233 as well as by
eliminating the seemingly arbitrary method of determining who may
claim a tax deduction under the current regulation. Accordingly,
Congress should bravely enter the education tax maze, dismantle
§ 25A and § 222, and slay the Education Regulation monster to pro-
vide more effective and simplified tax incentives for higher education
in the new millennium.
232 See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 17, at 43 (discussing
the policy objectives accomplished by combining § 25A and § 222).
233 Id. (discussing the policy objective of achieving more equitable benefits by
combining § 25A and § 222).
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